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INTRODUCTION 
What do we mean by a right to life? Should—or does—such 
a right cover only antiabortion claims? Or should the term 
apply more broadly—to debates about class and welfare, about 
the death penalty, or even about human rights? In the abortion 
wars, litigation strategy has helped to dictate the answers to 
these questions. Historians and legal scholars have studied the 
tensions between lawyers and the lay actors they represent, 
chronicling how lawyers modify and even limit the social 
changes activists demand.1 By putting the attorney-client 
relationship center stage, scholars have sometimes obscured an 
equally important story about how litigation strategy—as in 
the case of the antiabortion movement—can make a difference 
to internal battles about the meaning of a social cause. This 
Article explores the influence of litigation on a different 
struggle, one involving a movement’s constitutional vision and 
place in American politics. The Article uses the history of the 
antiabortion movement as an entry point for rethinking the 
role of litigation in the politics of social-movement identity, 
recovering how court-centered strategies transformed the 
meaning of a right to life. This history shows that victories in 
court can convince both lay actors and lawyers to discount 
alternative political identities and constitutional commitments, 
creating winners and losers in internal struggles over what 
defines a movement. 
Prior to and even after the decision of Roe v. Wade,2 a 
diverse group of lay activists and legal professionals argued for 
a right to life, supposedly rooted in the Declaration of 
Independence, human rights law, and even the Supreme 
Court’s privacy jurisprudence. While movement members 
agreed on the importance of using rights language and 
 
 1. For examples of key studies showcasing the complexity of the attorney-
client relationship, see generally MARK BRILLANT, THE COLOR OF AMERICA HAS 
CHANGED: HOW RACIAL DIVERSITY SHAPED CIVIL RIGHTS REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, 
1941–1976 (2012); TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND 
THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2012); RISA GOLUBOFF, THE 
LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007); NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT 
ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2008); SERENA MAYERI, 
REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 
(2011); THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY: THE FORGOTTEN STRUGGLE 
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE NORTH (2009).  
 2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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reaffirming constitutional protections for the fetus, this 
apparent consensus concealed deeper fights about the meaning 
of a right to life. Because they disagreed about the identity of 
their movement, competing activists found themselves deeply 
divided about the kind of law reform agenda they should 
formulate and the kind of allies they should pursue. In 
particular, activists fought about whether to align with the 
political Right or Left. 
Success in court proved to be a tipping point in internal 
battles over movement identity, empowering social 
conservative advocates who opposed “big government.” When 
an incremental litigation strategy made headway in the 
Supreme Court, movement members rallied around strategies 
centered on success in court. In the legislative arena, 
movement members prioritized regulations that the Supreme 
Court might uphold, thereby chipping away at abortion rights, 
exposing the supposed overreach of the Supreme Court, and 
highlighting the supposed incoherence of the Roe decision. Over 
time, as abortion opponents channeled more resources into this 
strategy, the movement had reason to align with conservative 
organizations committed to small government and opposed to 
judicial decisions restricting school prayer and mandating 
busing. Victory in court strengthened the hand of some 
movement members and marginalized others. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I lays out the long 
history of claims based on a right to life, and traces the shifting 
arguments that shaped dialogue about the New Deal order, the 
Cold War, and the poverty rights movement. Part II chronicles 
how these existing political and social divisions over the right 
to life fractured the early antiabortion movement. Some 
activists connected antiabortion beliefs to an understanding of 
the right to life similar to that elaborated during the Cold War, 
a right that included defense of the traditional family and war 
on the sexual revolution. Others strongly disagreed. These 
activists built on the meaning of a right to life as elaborated 
during the New Deal to assert that protection of the fetus 
naturally extended to other vulnerable persons, including 
single mothers and the poor. By contesting what a right to life 
meant, abortion opponents shaped the kind of political alliance 
they would seek, the legal goals they would prioritize, and the 
recruits they could attract. 
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Part III examines how litigation strategies fundamentally 
changed the course of identity contests in the antiabortion 
movement. In particular, this Part looks at new tactics 
developed by antiabortion attorneys in Chicago. These lawyers 
paid lip service to the legitimacy of the Supreme Court and the 
precedential value of the Roe v. Wade decision,3 all the while 
seeking to hollow out the Roe decision and reveal its logical 
shortcomings. When this strategy seemed to succeed, 
movement leaders applied it more broadly, focusing on the 
courts. As activists became preoccupied with overruling Roe, it 
became more appealing to align with groups concerned about 
judicial activism. 
Part IV positions this narrative in the larger scholarship 
on law and social change. First, the history studied in this 
Article reinforces scholars’ concerns about the dark side of 
winning in court. Even when litigation does not sideline 
movement radicals or discourage activists from pursuing more 
effective grassroots strategies, success in court can convince 
activists to swear off alternative visions of a cause. Victory in 
court, moreover, can create substantial path dependence, 
making it more costly and difficult to create a new identity and 
employ different tactics rather than to pursue established 
ones.4 
Second, this history significantly contributes to studies on 
the impact of rights rhetoric5 on social movements. The story of 
antiabortion constitutionalism builds on work highlighting the 
differing effects of rights rhetoric and litigation. By focusing on 
rights, competing antiabortion activists could make a 
remarkably fluid set of demands on the institutional status 
quo, both challenging and justifying existing privileges and 
 
 3. Id. 
 4. See generally JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE 
BATTLE OVER PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 53–54 (2002) 
(defining path dependent outcomes as “developmental trajectories that are 
inherently difficult to reverse”). Because of the inertia associated with path 
dependence, it may encourage activists to adopt strategies that do not fully 
address contemporary political realities. See id.; see also Oona Hathaway, Path 
Dependence in the Legal System: The Course and Pattern of Change in the 
Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 607, 616 (2001) (explaining how 
“developments in the past constrain the processes of change in important and 
predictable ways”).  
 5. By rights rhetoric, I refer to efforts to frame a claim, identity, or demand 
by reference to a fundamental (and often constitutional) right. 
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hierarchies. Indeed, it was in moving away from the language 
of legal rights that movement members adopted a narrower 
vision—and one certainly more disconnected from 
socioeconomic equality. At the same time, litigation itself 
tended to have a constraining effect, particularly since the 
movement lacked the public support to achieve its goals in the 
political arena. Lay actors and lawyers alike stayed away from 
arguments thought likely to jeopardize litigation strategies, 
and in the process narrowed their demands, pushed important 
arguments below the surface, and silenced voices once 
influential in movement circles. 
I. CHARTING A RIGHT TO LIFE UNRELATED TO ABORTION, 
1930–1973 
Does the rhetoric of legal rights constrain movements for 
social change? The history of the antiabortion movement 
contributes to a larger scholarly debate about whether rights 
rhetoric stunts or expands movements for social change. While 
some legal and political philosophers insist that rights be taken 
seriously as a basis for jurisprudence,6 other commentators 
question whether rights have any stable or objective content, 
calling attention to the expansion of judicial rights and “the 
endurance of the injustices that rights purported to 
address . . . .”7 Examining antiabortion constitutional change 
 
 6. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: 
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1331 (1988); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and 
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The 
Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women’s Movement, 61 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 651 (1986) (arguing that in the case of the women’s 
movement, “[r]ights discourse encouraged the articulation of feminist vision and 
furthered the process of political assertion”); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical 
Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 401, 415 (1987) (arguing that “the attainment of rights signifies the due, the 
respectful behavior, the collective responsibility properly owed by a society to one 
of its own”).  
 7. See Karen Tani, Rights and Welfare Before the Movement: Rights as a 
Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314, 370 (2012). Conservative critics have 
insisted that excessive use of rights talk destroyed community and hobbled 
institutions. See, e.g., FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970); 
RICHARD E. MORGAN, DISABLING AMERICA: THE “RIGHTS INDUSTRY” IN OUR TIME 
(1984); AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, 
AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: 
THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 14–15 (1991). Critics on the left, 
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campaigns from the 1960s to the 1980s demonstrates the 
surprising mutability of a “right to life.” Across time, a diverse 
group of activists used rights rhetoric to advance strikingly 
different agendas. Though often thought to offer hollow hope 
for change activists, rights rhetoric gave abortion opponents a 
crucial focal point for debate about movement identity. 
Far from ratifying established hierarchies, some abortion 
opponents used rights language to demand changes to the 
distribution of wealth and the role of government in providing 
for the poor. Others deployed rights rhetoric in a fight for the 
status quo, defending the privileges of the traditional family 
and praising small government. Rights rhetoric emerges as 
fluid in its uses and impact. The history of the antiabortion 
movement further shows the difference that victories in court 
can make, marginalizing some activists and putting others in 
positions of power. 
This Part explores the larger context of antiabortion 
identity struggles, recovering these historical battles about the 
meaning of a right to life and its relationship to sex, family, 
and welfare rights. It begins by unearthing New Dealers’ 
arguments about a right to life involving a guaranteed 
standard of living. Next, the Part studies the transformation of 
the right to life in battles about professional identity and 
lawyering during the Cold War. Finally, it chronicles the 
reappearance of a right to life in the agenda of the welfare 
rights movement. These different visions of a right to life 
divided the antiabortion movement, as activists championed 
opposing ideas about what their movement meant and which 
legal goals they should pursue. 
A. The New Deal Prompts Debate About the Right to Life 
Abortion opponents did not pioneer the idea of a right to 
 
such as some critical legal studies (CLS) scholars, asserted that rights reinforced 
existing power structures. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); Kristin Bumiller, Victims in 
the Shadow of the Law: A Critique of the Model of Legal Protection, 12 SIGNS 421 
(1987); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through 
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. 
L. REV. 1049 (1978). Postmodern critics argue that rights-based protections are 
unstable and indeterminate. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. 
L. REV. 1363 (1984). 
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life. Instead, in opposing efforts to change the laws on abortion, 
activists have drawn on a rich and contradictory rhetorical 
tradition entirely outside of the abortion debate. The idea of a 
right to life has figured centrally in battles about human rights 
law, the welfare state, and the Cold War. Since the Declaration 
of Independence proclaimed “a right to life, liberty, and 
happiness,”8 a variety of lawmakers, attorneys, and activists 
have framed their causes in reference to a right to life.9 
During the 1930s, as the Supreme Court struck down core 
New Deal legislation, social workers, administrators, and legal 
commentators turned to a right to life in offering a 
constitutional argument for a larger social safety net. During 
the 1932–1937 terms, the Supreme Court’s “Four Horsemen of 
the Apocalypse”—Justices Pierce Butler, James Clark 
McReynolds, George Sutherland, and Willis Van Devanter—
won enough votes to strike down the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1933 and the National Industrial Recovery Act, as well 
as minimum wage laws and regulations of the coal industry.10 
These decisions relied on a robust understanding of 
constitutional rights to property and contract.11 For example, 
in 1934, in Nebbia v. New York, a case involving the 
constitutionality of a New York law regulating the price of 
milk, the majority acknowledged that “neither property rights 
nor contract rights are absolute.”12 Nonetheless, led by the 
Four Horsemen, the Court insisted that “[u]nder our form of 
government, the use of property and the making of contracts 
are normally matters of private and not of public concern.”13 
Framing the right to life as protection of an individual’s 
power to make a living, advocates of the New Deal responded 
that a broader social safety net would protect individual rights 
 
 8. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
 9. See infra Part I.  
 10. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (deciding the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act); Schechter Poultry v. New York, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (deciding 
the National Industrial Recovery Act). On the influence and views of the “Four 
Horseman,” see BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE 
STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 20–24, 93–101 (1998); G. EDWARD 
WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 284–301 (2000); WILLIAM E. 
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN 
THE TIME OF ROOSEVELT 2, 36–43, 133–36, 155 (1995). 
 11. See CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 12, 14, 77, 133–34. 
 12. 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934). 
 13. Id. 
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rather than undermine them. These administrators, activists, 
and attorneys turned to the right to life in advancing their 
claims,14 arguing that it implied the power to make a living.15 
New Dealers argued that with the dramatic growth of the 
government and the increasing complexity of the economy, the 
State could not guarantee the right to life merely by leaving 
individuals alone.16 For that right to have any meaning, as 
advocates argued, the State had to act affirmatively to ensure 
that Americans could provide for their own basic needs.17 
Writing the same year that Nebbia was decided, Aubrey 
Williams, an assistant administrator for the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration, insisted that to protect the 
right to life, the State would have to provide some measure of 
economic security.18 As the government expanded and the 
economy grew more and more complex, Americans could no 
longer guarantee themselves a living through “character and 
industry.”19 Williams argued that in spite of social, economic, 
and political changes, “[t]he right to life supposedly still means 
the right to security of existence.”20 The New Deal State, in 
Williams’s view, did not stand in any tension with the 
Constitution. Instead, by creating welfare rights, the 
government would finally “take seriously a few of our 
forefathers’ principles.”21 
Williams’s argument—that the right to life guaranteed 
economic security—became a core justification for the New 
Deal order. During his time as governor of New York, Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt defended state economic intervention by 
proclaiming that “every man has a right to life, and this means 
 
 14. See Aubrey Williams, Standards of Living and Government Responsibility, 
176 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 38–39 (1934); Students Asked to Back 
NRA Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1933, at 3. New Dealers also presented access to 
healthcare as one facet of a right to life. See S. J. Woolf, Right to Life, Liberty, and 
Health, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1937, at 137 (quoting Dr. Thomas Parran of the 
American Public Health Association framing access to healthcare as part of a 
right to live). For more on the link between economic security and a right to live, 
see Dr. Berle Praises Aims of New Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1933, at 2. 
 15. See Williams, supra note 14, at 38–39 
 16. See id.; John A Ryan, President Roosevelt’s Economic Program, 23 IRISH 
Q. REV. 194, 199 (1933). 
 17. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 18. See Williams, supra note 14, at 38–39. 
 19. Id. at 38. 
 20. Id. at 39. 
 21. Id. 
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that he also has a right to make a comfortable living.”22 Grover 
Whalen, the chairman of the New York City Emergency Re-
Employment Committee, rallied support for the National 
Recovery Act, insisting: “[T]here can be no successful criticism 
of a new system which primarily champions constitutional 
rights and . . . the very right to exist.”23 By 1944, then-
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt announced a Second Bill 
of Rights connecting “rights to life and liberty” to “new goals of 
human happiness and well-being.”24 As Roosevelt explained: 
“[T]rue individual freedom cannot exist without economic 
security and independence.”25 However, the apparent success of 
those using a right to life in support of a guaranteed standard 
of living was short-lived. As this Article shows next, the Cold 
War and the social changes it produced moved the rhetoric of a 
right to life in a decidedly conservative direction. 
B. The Right to Life Changes in the Crucible of Cold War 
Politics 
In the aftermath of World War II and the shadow of the 
Cold War, the international community embraced an expansive 
understanding of the right to life that was reminiscent of the 
one championed by New Dealers. However, at home, attorneys 
and politicians made right-to-life rhetoric central to a defense 
of American supremacy, one rooted in the superiority of 
Christianity and the traditional family. 
Internationally, at the start of the Nuremberg Trials in 
November 1945, human rights proponents faced criticism for 
 
 22. See Ryan, supra note 16, at 199. 
 23. Students Asked to Back NRA Drive, supra note 14, at 3.  
 24. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Jan. 11, 
1944), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16518, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8Y4N-984V. For more on the right to life articulated by political 
leaders during the New Deal, see PAUL D. MORENO, THE AMERICAN STATE FROM 
THE CIVIL WAR TO THE NEW DEAL: THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
THE TRIUMPH OF PROGRESSIVISM 225–26 (2013); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, 
and Equal Citizenship, in MORAL PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN LIFE: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 186–88 (Karen Halttunen & Lewis 
Perry eds., 1998); WENDY WALL, INVENTING THE AMERICAN WAY: THE POLITICS 
OF CONSENSUS FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 212 (2008). 
Ironically, the early right-to-work movement would draw on the idea of a right to 
life in attacking the New Deal. See SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE 
CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT 72 (2014). 
 25. See Roosevelt, supra note 24. 
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punishing Nazi leaders for acts not formally criminalized at the 
time of their commission.26 International law scholars and 
policy makers responded by articulating previously implicit 
rights, among them, the right to life.27 In the human rights 
context, such a right covered protections from torture, murder, 
and forced sterilization. For example, a 1945 draft declaration 
of the International Rights and Duties of Man set forth a “right 
to life from the moment of conception . . . [that] includes the 
right to sustenance and support in the case of those unable to 
support themselves.”28 The UN Declaration on Human Rights 
would also include a right to life.29 
At the start of the Cold War, leaders of the American Bar 
Association (ABA) transformed this rhetoric, expressing 
skepticism about internationalism, and using the right to life 
as the symbol of American commitment to Christianity, small 
government, and the traditional family.30 As the Soviet Union 
expanded to include much of Eastern Europe, leading 
American attorneys sought to differentiate their own 
understandings of law and the legal profession. This vision of 
the right to life formed part of an American constitutional 
tradition centered on the importance of faith, small 
government, and the traditional family. In a 1947 speech, Chief 
 
 26. For discussion of the due process concerns surrounding the Nuremberg 
trials, see NORBERT EHRENFREUND, THE NUREMBERG LEGACY: HOW THE NAZI 
WAR CRIMES TRIAL CHANGED THE COURSE OF HISTORY 201–204 (2007); CHARLES 
ANTHONY SMITH, THE RISE AND FALL OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS: FROM CHARLES I TO 
BUSH II 113 (2012). 
 27. See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 
OEA/Ser.L.V.II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1948); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter 
Universal Declaration]. 
 28. See Draft Declaration of the International Rights and Duties of Man, 
WORLD AFF., 1945, at 200. In 1948, the final version of the declaration still 
mentioned a right to life, but modified references to conception that might have 
conflicted with laws on either abortion or the death penalty. See, e.g., The Baby 
Boy Case, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW: TREATIES, 
CASES, AND ANALYSIS 329 (Francisco Forrest Martin et al. eds., 2006). 
 29. See Universal Declaration, supra note 27, at Art. 3. For contemporary 
discussion of the right to life in the context of human rights, see “Right to Life” 
Added to Planned U.N. Pact, N. Y. TIMES, May 28, 1952, at 9. 
 30. See Human Rights: Not So Simple, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1956, at 32 (“In 
principle, we go along with any sincere declaration of human rights. . . . The 
Communists agreed to these lofty ideas too—with what spectacular hypocrisy the 
record shows.”); Eisenhower Urges Parley on Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1949, at 
1. 
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Justice Vinson laid out his ideas for the future of the bar, 
explaining: 
I believe in America: in her high destiny under God to stand 
before the people of this earth as a shining example of 
unselfish devotion to . . . the Christian ideal of liberty in 
harmonious unity, built of respect for God’s image in man 
and every man’s life, liberty, and happiness.31 
Chief Justice Vinson connected the right to life not to a 
guaranteed means of subsistence but to the superiority of 
American constitutionalism. The right to life stood for the 
virtues of the nuclear family, freedom from the State, and 
belief in God. 
Rather than expanding the protections guaranteed by the 
Constitution to include the poor, this iteration of the right to 
life reflected a narrow, existing tradition that distinguished 
democracy from communism. The ABA-led effort to redefine 
lawyers’ professional identity—one that would rely increasingly 
on the idea of a right to life—offers one powerful example of the 
campaign to protect American values from communist 
influence. In 1947, Attorney General (and future Supreme 
Court Justice) Tom C. Clark warned of a communist plot to 
infiltrate the bar, led by those who would “[use] every device in 
the legal category to further the interests of those who would 
destroy our government.”32 ABA leaders immersed themselves 
in Cold War politics, pitting the ABA against other attorneys.33 
Between 1948 and 1949, the ABA voted to expel all communist 
members and to support the activities of the House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC).34 
Efforts to counter subversive lawyering reflected a deeper 
fear of the growing power of government. In distinguishing 
 
 31. See Age of Great Challenge: Chief Justice Vinson Tells Its Dangers and 
Needs, 33 A.B.A. J. 1084, 1086 (1947). 
 32. Tom C. Clark, Civil Rights: The Boundless Responsibility of Lawyers, 32 
A.B.A. J. 453, 456–57 (1947). 
 33. On ABA politics during the Cold War, see JEROLD S. AUERBACH, 
UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 231–38, 
246–48 (1976); JAMES E. MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN 
CRISIS: RESISTANCE AND RESPONSES TO CHANGE 56–69 (2013).  
 34. See Communists and Communism: Association Votes in Support of the 
Mundt-Nixon Bill, 34 A.B.A. J. 899 (1948). 
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democracy from communism, ABA advocates turned to the 
right to life, presenting it as a uniquely American ideal 
connected to the virtues of small government. Right-to-life 
arguments played an especially crucial role in the conflict 
between the ABA and the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) in 
the early 1950s.35 Unlike the ABA, the NLG did not bar 
communists from joining, and the group attracted not only 
those with socialist or communist leanings but also civil-rights 
activists and civil libertarians.36 In the 1950s, the NLG 
championed a robust understanding of the First Amendment, 
but the group’s main push involved federally subsidized legal 
services for the poor.37 In 1949, encouraged by a report issued 
by the Rushcliffe Committee in England, a Guild committee 
described privately funded legal aid as “mere charitable 
indulgence.”38 By contrast, as the NLG viewed it, Americans 
had a right to an attorney, and legal assistance represented a 
“categorical constitutional imperative.”39 
The ABA rejected this proposal as the “socialization” of the 
law40—in the words of Judge Richard Hartshorne, it 
represented a “threat to the independence of the profession.”41 
While insinuating that the NLG was the “legal bulwark of the 
Communist Party,” ABA lawyers developed a broader attack on 
expansive government power. In particular, ABA leaders 
argued that as the State expanded, individuals’ constitutional 
rights came under fire. “Such governments,” wrote Judge 
Robert N. Wilkin, “take property without compensation, and 
 
 35. On the conflict between the ABA and the NLG during the Cold War, see 
AUERBACH, supra note 33, at 200–36; MOLITERNO, supra note 33, at 59–60. 
 36. NAACP attorney and future Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall—
a strong opponent of communism—served on the NLG Board prior to 1949. See 
Ernesto Longo, A History of America’s First Jim Crow Law School Library and 
Staff, 7 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 77, 94 (2007) (“Beginning in 1939, black lawyers 
were elected to the Guild’s national board, and in 1943, Charles Houston and 
Thurgood Marshall, among others, became associate editors of the Lawyer’s 
Guild Review.”). On the NLG’s ties to civil rights and civil liberties activism, see 
MOLITERNO, supra note 33, at 59–61. 
 37. See AUERBACH, supra note 33, at 236. 
 38. Id.  
 39. See id. 
 40. Robert Storey, The Legal Profession Versus Regimentation: A Program to 
Counter Socialization, 37 A.B.A. J. 100, 100 (1951). 
 41. Richard Hartshorne, The Bar and the Indigent Criminal Defendant, 37 
A.B.A. J. 104, 104 (1951). 
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life without even a trial.”42 
In opposition to socialized government, ABA leaders 
articulated a uniquely American constitutional tradition—one 
that rejected the “regimentation” and socialism supposedly 
peddled by the NLG. American constitutionalism required 
respect for individualism, Christianity, and the patriarchal 
family.43 In 1950, ABA President Harold J. Gallagher argued: 
The Soviet Union and its satellite states stand for the 
principle that the state is all powerful, that men are its 
mere servants. This is an atheistic concept. It ignores the 
human and divine dignity of man. It is a denial of the 
traditional concepts of the Declaration of Independence 
made effective in our Constitution.44 
Praising small government and voicing concerns about 
expansive federal power, ABA attorneys distanced themselves 
from the New Deal order and from early demands for poverty 
rights, framing the right to life as part of a constitutional 
regime based on tradition, history, and protection of the 
nuclear family. 
Despite the advances made by the ABA, struggles about 
the meaning of the right to life were far from over. Though 
attrition had almost destroyed the NLG, leaving the 
organization with only 600 members in 1956, a more expansive 
definition of the right to life reemerged at the outset of the War 
on Poverty.45 The next section will explore how arguments 
about the right to life focused again on guarantees of 
government support. 
 
 42. Robert N. Wilkin, What Are We Fighting For? The Need for Juridical 
Order, 37 A.B.A. J. 1, 1 (1951). 
 43. On the connection between anticommunism and commitment to 
Christianity, small government, and the traditional family, see DONALD T. 
CRITCHLOW, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY AND GRASSROOTS CONSERVATISM: A WOMAN’S 
CRUSADE 76 (2005); DANIEL FARBER, THE RISE AND FALL OF MODERN AMERICAN 
CONSERVATISM 110, 121–22 (2010). 
 44. Howard J. Gallagher, Our Basic Freedoms: The President’s Independence 
Day Address, 36 A.B.A. J. 731, 731 (1950). For similar arguments of this kind, see 
Bill of Rights Day Celebrated Here, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1948, at 32. 
 45. See GUENTER LEWY, THE CAUSE THAT FAILED: COMMUNISM IN AMERICAN 
POLITICAL LIFE 284–85 (1990).  
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C. During the War on Poverty, Right-to-Life Arguments 
Gain Momentum 
In the 1960s and 1970s, as poverty lawyers brought their 
cases to the courts, right-to-life arguments became more 
expansive, sparking demands for new entitlements and welfare 
rights. Claims of this kind appeared as early as the 1950s. The 
author of a book on the right to life,46 A. Delafield Smith, an 
attorney at the Office of General Counsel of the Federal 
Security Agency, contended in the late 1950s that social, 
political, and economic changes had made it necessary for the 
government to ensure an individual’s right to make a living.47 
“The time must come,” Smith explained, “when the declaration 
and implementation of a right to assistance . . . will lead to the 
enactment of a permanent self-operative system.”48 With the 
mobilization of welfare-rights advocates, arguments like 
Smith’s became a centerpiece of movement advocacy. Poverty 
lawyers and grassroots activists began arguing inside and 
outside of court that the right to life guaranteed a minimum 
standard of economic security. 
Members of the civil rights movement built on 
longstanding concerns about the intersection of poverty and 
discrimination, leveraging resources created by the War on 
Poverty.49 Prior to the 1960s, Legal Aid Societies had enjoyed a 
virtual monopoly in poverty law services.50 With new federal 
funding available for legal services for the poor, the number of 
poverty lawyers skyrocketed, climbing over 650 percent to 
 
 46. See generally A. DELAFIELD SMITH, THE RIGHT TO LIFE (1957). 
 47. See A. Delafield Smith, Public Assistance as a Social Obligation, 63 HARV. 
L. REV. 266, 288 (1949). 
 48. Id. Economist Alvin Hansen similarly argued that “[b]y and large the 
right to establish a business or to acquire free land and was adequate, in the 
nineteenth century, . . . to ensure the ‘right to life, liberty, and happiness.’ This is 
no longer the case.” ALVIN H. HANSEN, ECONOMIC POLICY AND FULL EMPLOYMENT 
15–16 (1947). 
 49. See FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POVERTY AND 
POLITICS IN MODERN AMERICA 69 (2007) (“The map of legal resources available to 
welfare recipients changed dramatically in the middle1960s.”). 
 50. See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1965–1973 11 (1993). 
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2,500 in 1971.51 
With the advent of the War on Poverty and increased 
federal funding, lawyers and activists used right-to-life rhetoric 
to demand basic necessities, welfare payments, and even access 
to credit. New organizations formed to advance this agenda, 
including law professor Edward V. Sparer’s Center for Social 
Welfare Policy and Law, a group committed not only to 
providing the poor with access to routine legal services but also 
to guaranteeing a right to financial support.52 Like Smith, 
Sparer asserted that the Constitution protected a right to 
live—shorthand for access to basic necessities.53 As poverty law 
flourished, grassroots activists and lawyers picked up on 
Sparer’s argument. Charles Rachlin and the legal office of the 
Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) began helping New York 
welfare recipients bring hearings to protect their rights.54 Led 
by former CORE member George Wiley, the National Welfare 
Rights Organization (NWRO) also used the right to life in 
demanding access to credit.55 
Similar rhetorical arguments soon shaped litigation in the 
Supreme Court. In 1968, in King v. Smith, attorney Martin 
Garbus challenged an Alabama statute denying payments 
under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
program to any woman in an extramarital sexual 
relationship.56 The Court did not directly mention a right to life 
but struck down the Alabama statute, holding that federal law 
preempted it.57 Interviewed by the New York Times following 
his victory, Garbus celebrated the demise of a law that 
deprived “helpless children” of their “right to life”—the AFDC 
payments on which so many families depended.58 In the wake 
of Smith, the 1968 ACLU Biennial Conference passed a 
 
 51. Id. at 10.  
 52. Id. at 81–82. 
 53. See id. For Sparer’s writings on the subject, see Edward V. Sparer, The 
New Legal Aid as an Instrument of Social Change, 1965 U. ILL. L. F. 57 (1965); 
Edward V. Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT 
THEY ARE, WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 65 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1971). 
 54. See, e.g., KORNBLUH, supra note 49, at 71; DAVIS, supra note 50, at 76, 92. 
 55. On the NWRO and the right to live, see KORNBLUH, supra note 49, at 126. 
 56. 392 U.S. 309, 314 (1968). The State deemed any man a woman was 
involved with outside of marriage a “substitute father.” Id. at 311. 
 57. Id. at 326–27, 334. 
 58. Walter Goodman, The Case of Mrs. Sylvester Smith: A Victory for 400,000 
Children, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1968, at 62. 
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resolution stating that “income should be provided and 
guaranteed as a matter of right,” and those present almost 
universally agreed “that constitutional justifications could be 
advanced for the theory of entitlement; [including] the right to 
life.”59 
The idea of a right to life spread from movement 
organizations to the academy. Sparer traveled around the 
country lecturing on a right to life that would “protect the 
rights of the powerless, the weak, and the dispossessed.”60 In 
1969, ACLU leader and New York University law professor 
Norman Dorsen told the New York Times that Sparer’s 
constitutional arguments “were sound legally as well as just in 
principle.”61 Charles Reich published a path-breaking article in 
the Yale Law Journal on the “new property,” arguing that the 
poor sometimes had protectable interests in welfare payments 
and other forms of state support.62 The work of scholars like 
Frank Michelman elaborated on a constitutional framework for 
welfare rights.63 
Encouraged by the outcome in King and the flourishing of 
scholarship supporting their cause, poverty lawyers believed 
that a series of Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s signaled 
the justices’ willingness to later recognize a substantive right 
to life. The Court’s use of right-to-life rhetoric began in 1969, 
with Shapiro v. Thompson.64 There, Vivian Thompson, a 
nineteen-year-old single mother, applied for AFDC support 
after moving to Hartford, Connecticut, to live with her 
 
 59. ACLU 1968 Biennial Conference, “Report on Workshop on Entitlement to 
Government Benefits” (June 20–25, 1968), in The ACLU Papers, Box 111, Folder 
9, Department of Special Collections and Rare Books, Mudd Library, Princeton 
University. 
 60. Israel Shenker, Guarantee of “Right to Live” Is Urged, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 
28, 1969, at 40. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See generally Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); 
see also Charles Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1265 
(1966).  
 63. See Frank Michelman, Foreword: The Supreme Court 1968 Term—On 
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 11–
13 (1969); Frank Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One 
View of Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 966–67 (1973). For 
similar arguments involving a right to live, see Bernard E. Harvith, Federal 
Equal Protection and Welfare Assistance, 31 ALB. L. REV. 210, 241–45 (1967). 
 64. 394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 
(1974). 
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mother.65 Relying on a residency-requirement law, the State 
denied Thompson’s request since she had not resided in state 
for a year at the time of her application.66 The Supreme Court 
struck down the law, holding that it unconstitutionally 
burdened Thompson’s right to travel.67 In dicta, the Court 
emphasized the importance of welfare aid, “upon which may 
depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means to 
subsist—food, shelter, and other necessities of life.”68 In 1970, 
the Court also handed down Goldberg v. Kelly, holding that 
welfare recipients were entitled to a hearing before the 
termination of benefits.69 
Although the Court had not recognized a substantive right 
to life, poverty lawyers and activists were energized by their 
victories in Shapiro and Goldberg and continued to push for 
explicit recognition of the right to life. They next challenged a 
Maryland maximum-grant statute that capped the AFDC 
payment available to a family regardless of how many children 
required support in Dandridge v. Williams.70 The Dandridge 
attorneys contended that the maximum-grant law interfered 
with the appellees’ right to life: 
Fundamental rights include those rights basic to survival 
and well-being whether or not they are specifically 
expressed in the Constitution. Certainly, in any hierarchy of 
rights the right to bare necessities of life and minimal 
physical well-being ranks as high as the right to procreate, 
privacy, vote, marry or travel. Indeed, as mentioned 
previously, these rights presuppose the existence of a basic 
right to life and are dependent upon such a right to life.71 
To the surprise of the Dandridge attorneys, the Court’s 
decision in the case marked the beginning of a series of defeats 
that dashed some of the hopes created by Shapiro and 
Goldberg. The Dandridge Court held that the maximum-grant 
 
 65. Id. at 623–24. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 633–42 
 68. Id. at 627. 
 69. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 70. 397 U.S. 471, 474–75 (1970). 
 71. Brief for Appellees at *44, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1969) 
(No. 131) 1969 WL 119896 (citations omitted). 
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law neither conflicted with the federal Social Security Act nor 
violated the Equal Protection Clause, implying that future 
challenges to welfare laws would fail so long as “the State’s 
action [was] rationally based and free from invidious 
discrimination.”72 Continuing this trend, in 1971, in Wyman v. 
James, the Court agreed that states could terminate welfare 
benefits if a recipient denied a caseworker access to her 
home.73 In 1973, in New York State Department of Social 
Services v. Dublino, the Court upheld a work requirement more 
demanding than the one set forth in federal law.74 
Nonetheless, for a variety of welfare rights activists and 
civil libertarians, the right to life remained a cornerstone of 
demands for a better standard of living for the poor. In the 
1970s, in seeking access to consumer credit, members of the 
NWRO argued that the Constitution guaranteed Americans’ 
basic needs.75 A divided ACLU revisited the issue of a right to 
life at its 1972 Biennial Conference. Those in favor of 
advocating for economic rights argued that existing ACLU 
policies “add[ed] up to the right to an adequate standard of 
living.”76 Another member agreed that “[e]qual protection 
requires the elimination of poverty.”77 Others objected, 
stressing that the pursuit of a right to life would be tactically 
counterproductive and intellectually dishonest.78 Ultimately, 
the organization voted to continue backing rights to economic 
security.79 
Before the start of the abortion wars, right-to-life rhetoric 
remained a prominent feature of American constitutional 
discourse. Progressives, poverty rights lawyers, and New 
Dealers used the right to life to demand new protections for the 
poor. Anticommunists, conservatives, and members of the ABA 
drew on the right to life in offering their own vision of the 
Constitution, one focused on the importance of God and the 
 
 72. 397 U.S. at 487.  
 73. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
 74. 413 U.S. 405 (1973). 
 75. See KORNBLUH, supra note 49, at 126. For discussion of the NWRO’s 
understanding of basic needs, see id. at 60; DAVIS, supra note 50, at 40–43. 
 76. ACLU, 1972 Biennial Conference Unedited Report: Economic Rights 
(June 10, 1972) (on file with The ACLU Papers, Box 111, Folder 9, Department of 
Special Collections and Rare Books, Mudd Library, Princeton University). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. 
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traditional family. Conflicts about the meaning of a right to life 
revealed deep social and political schisms along the lines of 
class, race, and ideology. The same fissures would plague the 
early antiabortion movement. As the next Part shows, the 
disagreements about the size and role of government that 
animated earlier fights about the right to life created a fault 
line in the antiabortion movement, dividing those who 
identified their cause with the political Right from those 
committed to a more responsive welfare state. 
II. THE CREATION OF AN ANTIABORTION RIGHT TO LIFE 
Social-movement struggles over identity—like the one that 
rocked the antiabortion movement—have profound stakes for 
groups seeking social change. Creating an identity often proves 
crucial for movement mobilization, empowering individual 
activists, and convincing them that their cause is worth 
pursuing.80 Perhaps more importantly, movement identity 
helps to determine the recruits a movement will attract, the 
legal goals recruits can pursue, and the coalitions they can 
forge. As social movement scholars Doug McAdam and Debra 
Friedman argue, a movement’s collective identity “will, in large 
part, determine both the number and kind of people who are 
likely to be attracted.”81 
In the mid-1960s, when states began to repeal or reform 
existing laws on abortion, those who would form the 
antiabortion movement fought intensely about how to define 
themselves, drawing on competing ideas about the right to life. 
These activists were predominantly white and Catholic, but the 
movement and its leadership included Americans with a 
variety of political beliefs and socioeconomic backgrounds, 
including Protestants, Jews, and other believers and non-
 
 80. See Todd Schroer, Technical Advances in Communication: The Example of 
White Racialist “Love Groups” and White Civil Rights Organizations, in IDENTITY 
WORK IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 79 (Jo Reger et al. eds., 2008); see also Jane Jensen, 
What’s in a Name? National Movements and Public Discourse, in SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS AND CULTURE 107–26 (Hank Johnson et al. eds., 1995); Verta Taylor 
& Nancy Whittier, Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lesbian 
Feminist Mobilizations, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 104-130 
(Aldon Morris et al. eds., 1994). 
 81. Doug McAdam & Debra Friedman, Collective Identity and Activism: 
Networks, Choices, and The Life of a Social Movement, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT THEORY 156–73 (Aldon Morris et al. eds., 1994). 
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believers.82 
While agreeing that rights for the unborn child belonged to 
a longstanding constitutional tradition, movement members 
interpreted the constitutional right to life in very different 
ways, reflecting conflicting ideas about the size of government 
and the justice of the economic and legal status quo. In 
examining these understudied conflicts, section A focuses on 
activists who saw legal abortion as part of a broader attack on 
everything that made America unique, particularly traditional 
sexual mores and family values. Echoing the right-to-life 
rhetoric that had defined anticommunism, these abortion 
opponents condemned what they saw as a wave of selfishness 
that would undermine the family and the moral norms that 
had made the nation great. By contrast, section B illuminates 
the efforts of those who described the right to life as part of a 
broader protectionist, welfare agenda. These activists lobbied 
for laws protecting women, children, and the poor from both 
discrimination and financial insecurity. 
This Part shows that disagreements about the meaning of 
the right to life created a larger rift in the antiabortion 
movement, as activists fought about how to link the abortion 
issue to other causes. Litigation—and victory in court—would 
change the course of internal battles dramatically. Seduced by 
the possibility of immediate success, movement members 
transformed their cause. 
A. The Right to Life as a War against the Sexual 
Revolution 
When states began reforming their abortion laws, some 
critics predicted that any change would unleash a wave of 
sexual promiscuity.83 Arguments about illicit sex reflected a 
worldview that was centered on opposition to contraception, 
homosexuality, and the sexual revolution. While often citing 
 
 82. On the diversity of the movement see ZIAD MUNSON, THE MAKING OF PRO-
LIFE ACTIVISTS: HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION WORKS 192 (2008); Keith 
Cassidy, The Right to Life Movement: Sources, Development, and Strategies, in 
THE POLITICS OF ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
(Donald T. Critchlow ed., 1996). 
 83. See Frank Ayd, Jr., Liberal Abortion Laws, AMERICA, Feb. 1, 1969, at 
130–32; CHARLES RICE, THE VANISHING RIGHT TO LIVE: AN APPEAL FOR A 
RENEWED REVERENCE FOR LIFE 125, 134 (1969). 
ZIEGLER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/19/2015  10:09 AM 
2015] IDENTITY CONTESTS 1293 
 
Catholic doctrine, these activists echoed earlier understandings 
of the right to life, particularly anticommunist arguments 
about what sets Americans apart. According to these activists, 
a commitment to marriage, to the nuclear family, and to 
heterosexuality defined American constitutional tradition. 
Abortion threatened that tradition by nurturing a culture of 
selfishness, individualism, sexual experimentation, and 
pleasure-seeking. 
Theo Stearns, a former hippie and the founder of Catholics 
United for Life, a group that picketed California abortion 
clinics, saw a connection between contraception and abortion 
because both involved “materialism and a mechanization of 
sex.”84 Charles Rice, an activist and law professor at Fordham 
and later Notre Dame, also argued that defending the right to 
life meant battling tolerance of homosexuality and birth 
control.85 Rice condemned not only abortion but also “the 
philosophy of unrestraint” and “pursuit of pleasure” that he 
thought had torn the nation apart.86 He argued that Americans 
should oppose abortion “not because it is sinful, according to 
the edict of any particular religion, but because it poses a clear 
and present danger to the endurance of the family as the basic 
unit of society.”87 
In seeking to protect the traditional family, some 
movement members identified a causal connection between the 
pursuit of pleasure, contraception, and abortion. Father Paul 
Marx, the founder of the antiabortion group Human Life 
International, explained this “contraceptive mentality” thesis 
as follows: “[T]he resolve to prevent a child from coming to be is 
often sufficiently strong that one will eliminate the child whose 
conception is not prevented.”88 
Others pinpointed what they saw as a cultural decline tied 
to the sexual revolution. Abortion opponent Dennis Caddy 
explained: “What we once termed ‘selfishness’ is now known as 
‘self-actualization,’ ‘self-fulfillment,’ or some other 
euphemism.”89 Noted antiabortion scholar John Noonan 
 
 84. MICHAEL W. CUNEO, THE SMOKE OF SATAN: CONSERVATIVE AND 
TRADITIONALIST DISSENT IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 64 (1999). 
 85. See generally RICE, supra note 83, at 125, 134. 
 86. Id. at 125. 
 87. Id. at 134. 
 88. CUNEO, supra note 84, at 62. 
 89. Dennis L. Caddy, Is Self-Actualization Actually Selfishness?, NAT’L PRO-
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similarly argued that Americans had pursued legal abortion 
“because they wanted freedom, particularly sexual freedom.”90 
Noonan explicitly tied the rise of abortion rights to changing 
gender roles, asserting that the momentum of the opposition 
grew because of “antagonism between the sexes.”91 The Society 
for a Christian Commonwealth (SCC), an absolutist group, 
summarized this understanding of the cause: “The SCC is 
dedicated to convincing all Americans that the attack on life in 
whatever form—birth control, abortion, euthanasia, genetic 
manipulation, denigration of sex—is wrong.”92 
Certainly, these hardliners drew on Catholic religious 
teachings about sex and contraception, and the hierarchy of the 
Catholic Church played a defining role in organizing and 
supporting antiabortion groups.93 Nonetheless, hardliners’ 
understanding of the antiabortion cause offered a deeper attack 
on shifting sexual mores and gender norms—one grounded in 
earlier anticommunist and pro-family rhetoric. The SCC’s 
flagship publication, Triumph, contended: “The Soviet Union is 
a formally atheistic country, and while some Americans have 
taken comfort in the difference, they should not.”94 
Activists in organizations like the SCC reaffirmed that the 
right to life and all it represented played a crucial role in 
distinguishing democracy from communism. By extension, 
when women “assert[ed] the power to control and manipulate 
human life,” women destroyed everything that made American 
 
LIFE J. (1979), at 14, in The National Pro-Life Journal Folder, The Wilcox 
Collection, University of Kansas.  
 90. John Noonan, Jr., Abortion in Our Culture, NAT’L PRO-LIFE J. (1979), at 
10–11 (on file with The National Pro-Life Journal Folder, The Wilcox Collection, 
University of Kansas).  
 91. Id. 
 92. SOCIETY FOR A CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH, PAMPHLET, “TOWARD A 
CHRISTIAN AMERICA: 1970, 1971 (n. d.) (on file with The Society for a Christian 
Commonwealth Folder, The Wilcox Collection, University of Kansas). 
 93. Bozell’s SCC relied on a then-marginalized millenialist vision of 
Catholicism. See CAROL MASON, KILLING FOR LIFE: THE APOCALYPTIC NARRATIVE 
OF PRO-LIFE POLITICS 139 (2002). Other hardliners echoed the idea of a 
contraceptive mentality formulated by Pope John Paul II. See CUNEO, supra note 
84, at 278–80. For discussion of Pope John Paul II’s vision of a contraceptive 
mentality, see Arland K, Nichols, Abortion and the Contraceptive Mentality, 
CRISIS MAG., Jan. 21, 2013, available at http://www.crisismagazine.com/2013/ 
abortion-and-the-contraceptive-mentality, archived at http://perma.cc/J9AQ-
PJ6W.  
 94. MASON, supra note 93, at 142 (quoting Brent Bozell, The Confessional 
Tribe, TRIUMPH, July 1970, at 11–15). 
ZIEGLER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/19/2015  10:09 AM 
2015] IDENTITY CONTESTS 1295 
 
democracy better than communism.95 As one attorney wrote in 
1963, these movement members connected abortion to “[t]he 
[in]stability of the marriage bond, . . . the corruption of youth, 
[and] the spread of sexual promiscuity.”96 Opposing abortion 
meant recognizing that “the state can, should, and does in fact 
legislate in the field of public morality.”97 
To advance their vision, activists formed their own 
organizations, including Brent Bozell’s Society for a Christian 
Commonwealth, Randy Engel’s United States Coalition for 
Life, and Theo Stearns’ Catholics United for Life.98 At other 
times, activists like Rice, Engel, and Bozell fought to set the 
agenda for larger, more influential groups like Americans 
United for Life and the National Right to Life Committee.99 
However, within organizations like the National Right to Life 
Committee and Americans United for Life, hardliners met 
resistance from advocates who voiced a very different vision of 
the right to life. Whether working on their own or in larger 
groups, as Section B shows, hardliners clashed with activists 
who understood the right to life—and the role of government in 
redistributing wealth—in very different terms. 
B. The Right to Life as Protection for the Vulnerable and 
the Dependent 
A second faction created a different right-to-life discourse, 
one that resembled New Deal arguments about economic 
security and protection of the vulnerable. Writing in 1972, 
Catholic feminist Sidney Callahan condemned abortion but 
endorsed broader support for the vulnerable, contending that 
“[t]he whole society has a responsibility for the next 
generation,” regardless of how “immature, helpless, or different 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. William J. Kenealy, Law and Morals, 9 CATH. LAW 200, 204 (1963). 
 97. Id. 
 98. On the Society for a Christian Commonwealth, see MASON, supra note 93, 
at 140–49; MARK D. POPOWSKI, THE RISE AND FALL OF TRIUMPH: THE HISTORY OF 
A RADICAL ROMAN CATHOLIC MAGAZINE, 1966–1976 104, 126, 139, 214–16 (2012). 
For the USCL’s account of its own history, see Early History, U.S. COALITION FOR 
LIFE, http://www.uscl.info/index.php?pr=History (last visited Jan. 25, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/6BT3-5C9X. On Catholics United For Life, see CUNEO, 
supra note 84, at 64–65. 
 99. In chronicling battles over birth control in these organizations, Part II 
later discusses conservatives’ influence over these groups. 
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[a person] is from white middle class adult males who have 
heretofore preempted the right to be fully human.”100 
After the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, activists 
began insisting that the government’s failure to support the 
poor and vulnerable forced some women to choose abortion. In 
July 1973, at the annual National Right to Life Convention, 
Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) told colleagues in the 
antiabortion movement: 
If we are to be for life, then we will be in the vanguard of 
those working to ensure that no human life comes into being 
ever need be threatened by abortion because of society’s 
negligence to provide for the need of all its citizens. We are 
the ones who must guarantee that the critical conditions of 
life—for food, shelter, health, and education—are available 
to every person in our society . . . .101 
Some of those who shared Hatfield’s perspective drew a causal 
connection between abortion and an inadequate social safety 
net. They argued that women resorted to abortion only when 
denied the benefits and economic security they deserved. As 
Reverend Jesse Jackson, an early ally of the antiabortion 
movement, explained: “Politicians argue for abortion largely 
because they do not want to spend the necessary money to feed, 
clothe, and educate more people.”102 
These activists also believed that both unborn children and 
all poor people—particularly unwed mothers—had a right to 
state support. Influential Minnesota activist Fred Mecklenburg 
articulated this position: 
For the woman who becomes pregnant . . . , we need positive 
programs of assistance in providing first-rate medical, 
psychological, financial, and social assistance . . . . It is also 
 
 100. Sidney Callahan, Feminist as Antiabortionist, NAT’L CATH. REP., Apr. 7, 
1972, at 11. 
 101. Press Release, From the Office of Senator Mark O. Hatfield (June 10, 
1973), in The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 4, National Right 
to Life Convention Folder.  
 102. Jesse Jackson, How We Respect Life Is Over-Riding Moral Issue, NAT’L 
RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Jan. 1977, at 5, in The National Right to Life News 
Collection, 1977 Box, Dr. Joseph R. Stanton Human Life Issues Library and 
Resource Center, Sisters for Life Convent, Bronx, New York. 
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the only alternative which offers any possibility of success 
that will still preserve the basic values of respect for life 
that characterizes American democracy.103 
Mecklenburg favored welfare rights both as a strategy for 
reducing the need for abortion and as a necessary extension of 
the right to life. Judith Fink, a founding member of the 
National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) and prominent 
activist, shared Mecklenburg’s perspective. She called on her 
colleagues to support legislation against pregnancy 
discrimination, urging abortion opponents to help “change 
discriminatory insurance practices, improve supportive 
services for mothers and babies, and help pregnant workers 
with disability payments . . . .”104 Fink believed that such 
measures would both prevent abortion and help poor women, 
and she argued that such laws represented “the minimum that 
must be done if we truly care about enhancing the conditions of 
life [for mothers and children].”105 
Not surprisingly, the very different ideas of a right to life 
dividing welfare supporters from hardliners led movement 
members to embrace different legal reforms and policy 
objectives. Rather than working with conservative Catholics or 
Protestants, Mecklenburg and her colleagues often sided with 
Planned Parenthood and feminist groups in demanding 
legislation that outlawed pregnancy discrimination or 
guaranteed financial support for adolescent mothers.106 As 
section C demonstrates next, political and legal disagreements 
about contraception brought fights about the right to life to the 
surface in explosive new ways. 
 
 103. Dr. Fred Mecklenburg, Minnesota Should Seek Sexual Responsibility, Not 
“Easier” Abortions, in The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 23, 
Administrative File: People, General. 
 104. Press Release, American Citizens Concerned for Life, Pro-Life Group Says 
General Electric Corp. “Encourages Abortion” in Gilbert Case; Calls for Support of 
Legislation to Provide Pregnancy Disability Payments (Mar. 15, 1977), in The 
American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 16, Press Releases Folder. 
 105. Press Release, supra note 101, at 1. 
 106. Mary Ziegler, Beyond Backlash: Legal History, Backlash, and Roe v. 
Wade, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 969, 991–95 (2014). 
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C. Battles About Contraception Expose Fissures in the 
Antiabortion Movement 
Clashes about birth control brought to the surface 
longstanding disagreements about the antiabortion 
movement’s identity. Hardliners saw access to contraception as 
the reason so many Americans had sought out abortion. 
Moreover, for these abortion opponents, birth control and 
sexual pleasure reflected a dangerous form of selfishness that 
the movement had to combat. By contrast, activists like Judy 
Fink and Marjory Mecklenburg saw birth control as one 
resource the government should provide for women struggling 
to make a living. The battle over birth control exposed deeper 
questions about movement identity, objectives, and ideology. 
Should the antiabortion movement stand against the sexual 
revolution, or should defending the right to life primarily 
involve efforts to protect the economic security of all weak and 
vulnerable Americans? 
In 1972, the birth control issue impacted Americans 
United for Life (AUL), the group that would become the leading 
antiabortion, public-interest litigation organization.107 
Antiabortion activists organized the AUL to educate the public 
about abortion and to signal the movement’s educational 
pedigree and religious diversity.108 Hardliners like Brent Bozell 
and Charles Rice played an instrumental role in the AUL’s 
founding, as did ACLU member George Huntston Williams and 
Marjory Mecklenburg, the wife of Fred Mecklenburg and the 
Chairman of the NRLC.109 However, even hardliners split on 
issues such as access to birth control and exceptional 
 
 107. See ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE 
CONSERVATIVE COALITION 16 (2008) (discussing the origins of the AUL’s litigation 
efforts). 
 108. See Americans United for Life, A Declaration of Purpose (n. d.), in The 
Americans United for Life Papers, Box 91, Executive File, Concordia Seminary, 
Lutheran Church Missouri Synod (explaining that the organization’s purpose was 
to demonstrate and draw attention to the evils of all anti-life policies); 
Fundraising Letter, Americans United for Life, (Aug. 10, 1972) in The Americans 
United for Life Papers, Box 91, Executive File, Concordia Seminary, Lutheran 
Church Missouri Synod. 
 109. For a list of the early AUL leadership, see Letter from George Huntston 
Williams to AUL Directors (June 19, 1972), in The Americans United for Life 
Papers, Box 91, Executive File, Concordia Seminary, Lutheran Church Missouri 
Synod. 
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circumstance abortions. 
In detailing his opposition to “abortion on demand,” 
Williams wrote a book chapter arguing in favor of 
contraception and sex education.110 Since Williams predicated 
his opposition to abortion on a theory of sexual responsibility, 
he also favored exceptions to abortion bans under certain 
circumstances, including rape and incest.111 
Bozell wrote a letter to sympathetic AUL members, 
including Charles Rice, arguing that the group was not truly 
pro-life because some members favored exceptions to abortion 
bans and access to “abortifacient” contraceptives.112 Rice 
shared Bozell’s anger. Dissatisfied that the AUL would not 
take a strong enough stand against the pill, and angry that the 
organization would not vote for a resolution opposing all 
abortion without exception, he and several of his allies 
resigned, while activists who favored birth control, like Marjory 
Mecklenburg and Williams, gained more influence.113 
The fight over birth control and movement identity spread 
across movement organizations. The NRLC, the nation’s 
largest organization, found itself deadlocked, split between 
supporters of Catholic President Edward Golden and Marjory 
Mecklenburg, a staunch supporter of birth control.114 Hardliner 
Randy Engel called for Mecklenburg’s expulsion from the 
group, arguing that she and her husband had called “for Uncle 
Sam to come into the bedrooms of Americans and assume a 
more dominant role than he already has.”115 Although 
resoundingly re-elected to the NRLC Executive Committee, 
Mecklenburg narrowly lost the presidential campaign to 
 
 110. See George Huntston Williams, The Sacred Condominium, in THE 
MORALITY OF ABORTION 169–71 (John T. Noonan ed., 1970). 
 111. See id.  
 112. Letter from Brent Bozell to John F. Hillebrand (Mar. 3, 1972), in The 
Americans United for Life Papers, Box 91, Executive File, Concordia Seminary, 
Lutheran Church Missouri Synod. 
 113. See PATRICK ALITT, CATHOLIC INTELLECTUALS AND CONSERVATIVE 
POLITICS IN AMERICA 187 (1993).  
 114. On the divisions between Golden and Mecklenburg, see WILLIAM P. 
MALONEY, THE OWL IN THE SAGUARO: REPORT TO OFFICERS AND BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE OF NEW MEXICO 5 (1974), in The 
American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 8, 1974 NRLC Board and 
Executive Committee Folder 1. 
 115. Letter from Randy Engel to NRLC Board of Directors (Mar. 30, 1974), in 
The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 8, 1974 NRLC Board and 
Executive Committee Folder 1. 
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Golden and resigned to lead an organization that better 
reflected her view of the antiabortion cause.116 
With activists championing radically different visions of 
the movement identity, abortion law and politics remained 
highly unpredictable throughout the later 1970s. Would the 
antiabortion movement align with the political Right or Left? 
Would activists maintain a single-issue focus? Or would 
abortion opponents instead embrace one of the broader agendas 
promoted by either hardliners or welfare supporters? 
New absolutist organizations, like the American Life 
League (ALL) and the Pro-Life Action League (PLAL), formed 
to reshape the law on birth control, sex education, and the 
Equal Rights Amendment.117 In 1977, Judie Brown, an 
abortion opponent who went on to found the ALL, spearheaded 
efforts to pass the first NRLC resolution against a 
constitutional sex-equality guarantee.118 Later, Brown and her 
allies pushed for Ronald Reagan’s proposal to include Title X in 
a state block-grant program, allowing conservatives at the 
state level to restrict or defund family planning.119 Brown and 
her colleagues called on the movement to wage war on “pill-
pushing Planned Parenthood.”120 As she explained: 
The real choice that adolescents have, who have been 
brainwashed by the ‘new’ sexual value system of Planned 
 
 116. On the fight surrounding Mecklenburg’s election, see Meeting Minutes, 
NRLC Board of Directors 11 (June 7–9, 1974), in The American Citizens 
Concerned for Life Papers, Box 8, 1974 NRLC Board and Executive Committee 
Folder 1. On Mecklenburg’s resignation and decision to join the ACCL, see Letter 
from Marjory Mecklenburg to NRLC Board of Directors (Oct. 8, 1974), in The 
American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 8, 1974 NRLC Board and 
Executive Committee Folder 1. 
 117. On the formation and positions of the ALL, see Michael W. Cuneo, Life 
Battles: The Rise of Catholic Militancy Within the American Pro-Life Movement, in 
BEING RIGHT: CONSERVATIVE CATHOLICS IN AMERICA 280 (Mary Jo Weaver & R. 
Scott Appleby eds., 1995); CUNEO, supra note 84, at 61–66. On the PLAL, see 
CUNEO, supra note 84, at 67–68, 76, 78; JAMES RISEN & JUDY THOMAS, THE 
WRATH OF ANGELS: THE AMERICAN ABORTION WAR 67, 111–13 (1998). 
 118. See Letter from Judie Brown to Recipients of First Class Mailing (Oct. 17, 
1977), in The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 11, 1977 NRLC 
Folder 7. 
 119. On the ALL’s Title X campaign, see ROBERT O. SELF, ALL IN THE FAMILY: 
THE REALIGNMENT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY SINCE THE 1960S 381 (2012). On 
the ALL’s view at the time, see The Pill and Politics, A.L.L. ABOUT NEWS, Aug. 
1981, in The A.L.L. About News Folder, Wilcox Collection, University of Kansas.  
 120. The Pill and Politics, supra note 119. 
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Parenthood and the drug industry, is a choice between the 
acknowledged risks of oral contraceptives and abortion.121 
Whereas absolutists like Brown called on the movement to 
destroy Planned Parenthood, those who connected welfare 
rights with opposition to abortion joined with family planning 
supporters to push protective legislation for the poor, pregnant 
women, children, and unwed mothers. Groups like Marjory 
Mecklenburg’s American Citizens Concerned for Life (ACCL) 
lobbied with Planned Parenthood for the School Age Mother 
and Child Act of 1975, an ultimately unsuccessful bill that 
would have funded childcare, health care, family planning, and 
other services for adolescent mothers and children.122 The 
group again sided with feminists in promoting the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978, supporting the law with or without 
an exception for post-abortion leave for women.123 In 1978, the 
ACCL helped to pass the Adolescent Health, Services, 
Pregnancy Prevention and Care Act, a law that provided 
extensive support and preventative services for young 
mothers.124 These laws reflected a particularly influential 
vision of the meaning of the right to life—one built partly on 
efforts to expand the welfare state and the right to make a 
 
 121. Teenagers, ‘Responsible Sex Education,’ and Contraceptives, A.L.L. ABOUT 
ISSUES, Apr. 1981, in The A.L.L. About Issues Folder, Wilcox Collection, 
University of Kansas.  
 122. On the ACCL’s support, see School Age Mother and Child Health Act of 
1975: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. of Labor and 
Welfare, 94th Cong. 499 (1975) (statement of Marjory Mecklenburg). For a 
description of the proposed law, see id. at 1–2, 10–16. For Planned Parenthood’s 
support of the law, see id. at 552–81 (statement of Jack Hood Vaughn of Planned 
Parenthood) (supporting the Act). 
 123. See Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearings on S. 995 Before 
the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the S. Comm. on Human Res., 95th Cong. 
432–41 (1977) (statement of Jacqueline Nolan-Haley of American Citizens 
Concerned for Life) (showing group’s support for the Act); Legislation to Prohibit 
Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy Part 2: Hearing on H.R. 5055 & 
H.R. 6075 Before the H. Subcomm. on Emp’t Opportunities of the H. Comm. on 
Educ. and Labor, 95th Cong. 66 (1977) (statement of Dr. Dorothy Czarnecki of 
American Citizens Concerned for Life); Letter from Marjory Mecklenburg to 
Representative James Tonry 1 (Mar. 8, 1978), in The American Citizens 
Concerned for Life Papers, Box 19, Fundraising Folder (explaining that the ACCL 
supported the PDA “as a pro-life bill with or without an abortion amendment”). 
 124. See Adolescent Health Services and Pregnancy Prevention and Care Act of 
1978: Hearing on H.R. 12146 Before the S. Comm. on Human Res., 95th Cong., 
422–40 (1978) (statement of Marjory Mecklenburg) (supporting the Act); see id. at 
192–93 (statement of Faye Wattleton of Planned Parenthood). 
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living. The ACCL identified the root of the abortion problem as 
follows: 
[I]n the United States today by almost any standard 25 
million people are poor, and discrimination against minority 
groups seems to be endemic. In practice, liberty and 
property are more valued than someone’s life.125 
The solution, in the view of ACCL members, involved more 
protective legislation, more robust antidiscrimination 
protections for women, and a better social safety net for the 
poor. As the group’s official materials explained: “If troubled 
pregnant women are to have an opportunity to give birth to 
healthy babies we must create a society that cares about both 
and is willing to extend a hand of love and support.”126 
In the evolution of antiabortion politics, intra-movement 
identity contests helped to determine not only whether 
activists could pursue social change but also what kinds of 
shifts advocates could demand. As Part III will show, litigation 
further changed the course of internal identity struggles. 
Convinced that the movement stood the greatest chance of 
making progress in the courts, activists not only channeled 
more resources into litigation, but also reworked other 
arguments and plans to advance court-oriented strategies. To 
be sure, litigation represented only one of many factors—
including political party realignment, the emergence of the 
New Right and the Religious Right, and even the personalities 
and biographies of different leaders—that set the terms of 
internal battles. Nonetheless, as Part III shows, litigation can 
transform internal fights about what a social movement means. 
III. IDENTITY AND VICTORIES IN COURT 
Unwilling to waver from their commitment to abortion 
bans with no exceptions, movement attorneys had consistently 
asked the courts to recognize rights of the fetus or to overrule 
 
 125. William C. Hunt & Joseph A. Lampe, Strategy Considerations for ACCL 
Involvement in Abortion and Related Issues 1–7 (n. d.), in The American Citizens 
Concerned for Life Papers, Box 18, 1977 Strategy Folder.  
 126. ACCL Philosophy and Objectives (n. d.), in The American Citizens 
Concerned for Life Papers, Box 17, ACCL Philosophy and Objectives Folder.  
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Roe outright.127 However, in the mid-1970s, a group of lawyers 
working in Chicago began experimenting with a different 
litigation strategy. Rather than trying to convince the courts to 
recognize a constitutional right to life, these attorneys 
contended that Roe v. Wade protected only a narrow right to 
abortion. Even under Roe, these attorneys stressed that many 
abortion restrictions passed constitutional muster. Activists 
first hoped that the strategy would give legislators more 
freedom to restrict abortion. In the long term, by changing how 
the courts interpreted the Roe decision, antiabortion attorneys 
wanted to present it as unworkable and confusing. In 
particular, focusing on Roe’s flaws allowed attorneys to make 
the case that the decision represented a particularly egregious 
example of judicial overreach and the abuse of federal power. 
Highlighting the problems with the decision would set the 
stage for its overruling. 
With the movement now focused on overruling Roe, 
activists made changes in the political arena, showcasing the 
supposed tyranny of the Court and thereby creating an 
argument that naturally appealed to conservative groups that 
were already angry about big government. And as abortion 
opponents focused more heavily on reshaping the Supreme 
Court, coalition politics became more important than ever. 
With powerful political allies, antiabortion activists hoped to 
exert more influence over both presidential elections and 
judicial selections. Starting in the early 1980s, movement 
members could most effectively influence the nomination 
process by siding with newly mobilized social conservatives. 
Litigation helped to transform the movement’s strategy outside 
of court as well as in it. The movement’s emphasis on litigation 
played an important part in pushing the movement to the 
political right. 
In the mid-1970s, as section A explores, antiabortion 
attorneys refined a new incremental litigation strategy 
designed to narrow abortion rights and convince the public of 
the Roe Court’s activism. Section B chronicles how activists 
and attorneys reworked this approach to litigation, making it 
into an overarching plan of attack for the movement. Section C 
fleshes out the profound political consequences abortion 
 
 127. See generally Ziegler, supra note 106.  
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opponents faced after building movement tactics around 
success in court. 
A. The Birth of a Litigation Strategy 
Litigation was nothing new to the antiabortion movement 
of the 1970s. In addition to defending existing abortion bans, 
some antiabortion activists went on the offensive, sometimes 
seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent 
fetuses scheduled for abortion.128 After 1973, abortion 
opponents instead prioritized an Article V constitutional 
amendment—one that would rewrite the Fourteenth 
Amendment to outlaw all abortions.129 Some movement 
members, including prominent movement attorney, NRLC and 
AUL leader Dennis Horan, questioned the wisdom of this 
tactic.130 More fundamentally, Horan argued for the value of “a 
National Public Interest law firm, which would . . . spearhead 
litigation toward the ultimate goal of reversing Roe v. Wade.”131 
In trying to find new ways to attack the Roe decision, the 
AUL would become a very different organization, one focused 
on gradual changes in the courts. Quietly, the group honed a 
new litigation strategy that it debuted during the litigation of 
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth.132 
Danforth involved a multi-restriction Missouri statute, 
requiring spousal consent, parental consultation, and written 
 
 128. The guardian ad litem cases included Byrn v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. 
Corp., 335 N.Y.S. 2d 390 (App. Div. 1972). For more on the Byrn case, see Robert 
E. Tomasson, A Lawyer Challenges the Abortion Law, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1971, at 
29; Order Is Sought in Abortion Suit: Judge Is Asked to Put Curb on Practice 
During Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1971, at 32; Judy Klemesrud, He’s the Legal 
Guardian for the Fetuses About to Be Aborted, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1972, at 48. 
For another key example of a guardian-ad-litem case, see Doe v. Scott, 321 F. 
Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971). 
 129. On the emphasis abortion opponents put on an Article V amendment in 
the mid-1970s, see Cassidy, supra note 82, at 146; PATRICIA MILLER, GOOD 
CATHOLICS: THE BATTLE OVER ABORTION IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 73 (2014). 
 130. On Horan’s skepticism about antiabortion preoccupation with a 
constitutional amendment, see Letter from Dennis Horan to NRLC Policy 
Committee 1–3 (Sept. 5, 1973), in The American Citizens Concerned for Life 
Papers, Box 8, 1973 NRLC Folder 4 (telling colleagues that an amendment would 
“solve only some, but not all, of our problems” and would require “further state 
legislation in order to plug the loopholes”). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
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consent before a woman could have an abortion.133 The AUL 
intervened in one of the cases consolidated with Danforth, and 
an AUL board member, Dr. Eugene Diamond, was appointed as 
guardian ad litem for fetuses impacted by a similar Illinois 
antiabortion statute.134 While the AUL’s amicus brief in 
Danforth repeated many conventional antiabortion 
constitutional arguments,135 the group emphasized that “each 
justice who joined in this Honorable Court’s opinion in Roe v. 
Wade . . . recognized that the right of privacy . . . is subject to 
limitation.”136 The brief assumed that Roe required strict 
judicial scrutiny of all abortion restrictions but nonetheless 
argued that some regulations were narrowly tailored to serve 
an important state interest.137 The brief highlighted dicta in 
Roe indicating that the abortion decision was stressful and 
high-stakes.138 Informed-consent regulations survived strict 
scrutiny because “the requirement in no way infringes on [the 
woman’s] right to have an abortion and does not regulate the 
procedure itself.”139 
Similarly, in defending Missouri’s spousal-consent 
measure, the AUL emphasized that the Court had not decided 
the issue of fathers’ rights.140 “There is nothing in Roe which 
precludes the possibility that the state may raise separate 
‘compelling’ interests beyond the two raised by the statutes of 
Georgia and Texas of Roe and Doe,” the brief argued. “[H]ere, 
the state’s interest is in [protecting] ‘the relation integrity,’ 
‘bilateral loyalty,’ ‘mutuality,’ and ‘harmony in living’ of the 
marriage relation through balancing the procreative and 
parental rights of husband and wife.”141 
The Court’s decision in Danforth represented surprising 
 
 133. See id. at 58–59. 
 134. See Motion and Brief, Amicus Curiae of Dr. Eugene Diamond and Ams. 
United for Life, Inc., in Support of Appellees in 74-1151 and Appellants in 74-1419 
at *2–4, Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (Nos. 74-1151, 74-1419), 1976 WL 178721.  
 135. See id. at *35–42. 
 136. See id. at *45.  
 137. See id. at *46 (“The issue before this Honorable Court, then, is whether 
the statutory provisions being challenged are protective of an important or 
‘compelling’ state interest and whether they are ‘narrowly drawn to express only 
the legitimate state interests at stake.’”). 
 138. See id. at *83–85.  
 139. Id. at *12. 
 140. See id. at *12–13. 
 141. Id. In Roe, the Court highlighted state interests in fetal life and maternal 
health. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). 
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progress for the antiabortion movement. The Court upheld 
several parts of the Missouri statute.142 The majority rejected a 
challenge to the statute’s definition of viability even though it 
made no mention of the Roe trimester framework.143 The Court 
also drew on the AUL’s logic in upholding a prior-consent 
requirement. “The decision to abort . . . is an important, and 
often a stressful one,” Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority, 
“and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full 
knowledge of its nature and consequences.”144 Even in striking 
down other parts of the statute, the Court framed these 
measures as extraordinarily broad—awarding a functional veto 
to either a woman’s spouse or parents.145 
The AUL built on the advances made in Danforth in a 
series of cases about one of the most intensely contested legal 
issues of the 1970s—the constitutionality of laws limiting the 
public funding of abortion. In 1976, Congress passed the Hyde 
Amendment, a ban on the use of federal Medicaid funding for 
most abortions, and many states followed suit.146 In Maher v. 
Roe, the Court considered the constitutionality of a Connecticut 
law authorizing Medicaid funding only for first-trimester 
abortions that were deemed “medically necessary.”147 Poelker v. 
Doe involved a St. Louis policy that prevented the performance 
of elective abortions in city-owned hospitals.148 In a final case, 
Beal v. Doe, the Court addressed whether Title XIX of the 
federal Social Security Act required states participating in the 
Medicaid program to fund abortions not certified as medically 
necessary by a physician.149 
The AUL’s brief in Poelker elaborated on the strategy 
pioneered in Danforth—claiming deference to Roe while 
rewriting its protections. First, the brief argued that the Court 
had assigned the abortion right partly to the physician, who 
could refuse to perform the procedure for any reason.150 Under 
 
 142. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63–65 
(1976).  
 143. See id. at 63–65. 
 144. Id. at 67.  
 145. See id. at 69, 75. 
 146. Pub. L. No. 94-439, 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976). 
 147. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470–77 (1977). 
 148. See Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521–22 (1977).  
 149. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445–48 (1977).   
 150. See Motion and Brief, Amicus Curiae of Dr. Eugene Diamond and Ams. 
United for Life, Inc., in Support of Appellees in 74-1151 and Appellants in 74-1419 
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Roe, the Poelker brief argued that “the abortion decision is a 
medical decision that cannot be effectuated unless it is arrived 
at in consultation and in agreement with a physician.”151 
Women had no right to access abortion. Rather, Roe gave 
women nothing more than the right to ask someone else to 
perform the procedure.152 As the brief framed it, the Court had 
recognized a right belonging to a “woman in consultation with 
her physician, not the woman alone demanding of her 
physician.”153 
A second and ultimately more successful argument 
exploited the idea that abortion rights involved freedom from 
state interference and nothing more. As the AUL Legal 
Defense and Education Fund brief explained: “If the abortion 
decision is so private . . . it follows that government shall not 
itself be compelled to respond to the demand of the exercise of 
that right.”154 If a woman could not afford an abortion or 
required the services of a public hospital, the State had no 
constitutional obligation to help her.155 
Maher, the lead case, relied on privacy reasoning similar to 
the AUL’s to cut back on abortion rights. The majority quickly 
disposed of any argument involving discrimination on the basis 
of wealth or class.156 In discussing a potential violation of the 
woman’s right to privacy, the Court, like the AUL brief, 
emphasized that “there is a basic difference between direct 
state interference with a protected activity and state 
encouragement of an alternative activity . . . .”157 As the Maher 
Court framed it, poor women carried financial burdens that 
had little to do with the State. “An indigent woman who desires 
an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of 
Connecticut’s decision to fund childbirth,” the majority 
explained.158 “[S]he continues as before to be dependent on 
 
at *7, 15, Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth 428 U.S. 52 (Nos. 74-1151, 
74-1419), 1976 WL 178721. 
 151. See Motion and Brief, Amicus Curiae of Ams. United for Life, Inc. in 
Support of Petitioner John H. Poelker at 7, Poelker 432 U.S. 519 (No. 75-442).  
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. 
 154. See Brief for Ams. United for Life as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 17, Poelker 432 U.S. 519 (No. 01-1015).  
 155. See id.  
 156. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977). 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. at 474. 
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private sources for the service she desires.”159 Maher followed 
the AUL brief in describing abortion—and perhaps privacy 
rights more broadly—as purely negative rights. If women 
enjoyed nothing more than freedom from state meddling, the 
State could deny poor women abortion funding with impunity. 
Poelker and Beal picked up on the theme set out in Maher. 
In Poelker, the Court upheld the St. Louis ban on abortions in 
public hospitals, reasoning that the question presented was 
“identical in principle with that presented by a State’s refusal 
to provide Medicaid benefits for abortions while providing them 
for childbirth.”160 Beal concluded that state Medicaid bans did 
not conflict with the federal Social Security Act.161 By 
emphasizing a narrow interpretation of Roe and asking only for 
incremental change, the AUL seemed to have made a 
substantial advance in the courts. 
In antiabortion circles, Maher, Poelker, and Beal seemed to 
represent a crucial turning point. AUL leader Dr. Joseph 
Stanton used these victories in arguing that litigation was “the 
most important aspect of the pro-life movement at this time.”162 
Mildred Jefferson, then the president of the largest national 
antiabortion organization, urged “[e]veryone who speaks in the 
right to life movement or who participates in the educational 
effort in any way” to read Maher, Beal, and Poelker.163 The 
National Right to Life News described the 1977 wins in the 
Supreme Court as “historic.”164 Delighted by the success of its 
litigation strategies, the AUL redefined itself, elevating an 
attorney to the position of executive director and recognizing a 
“change in the thrust of the organization.”165 What had been an 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Poelker, 432 U.S. at 521. 
 161. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447–48 (1977). 
 162. Letter from Dr. Joseph Stanton to AUL Board of Directors 1 (Aug. 1977), 
in The George Huntston Williams Papers, Box 5, Folder 7, Andover-Harvard 
Theological Library, Harvard Divinity School.  
 163. Mildred Jefferson, Lifelines, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Aug. 17, 1977, at 
9, in The National Right to Life News Collection, 1977 Box, Dr. Joseph R. Stanton 
Human Life Issues Library and Resource Center, Sisters for Life Convent, Bronx, 
New York. 
 164. Liz Jeffries, Court Rules Funding Not Required, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE 
NEWS, Aug. 17, 1977, at 1, 3, in The National Right to Life News Collection, 1977 
Box, Dr. Joseph R. Stanton Human Life Issues Library and Resource Center, 
Sisters for Life Convent, Bronx, New York. 
 165. AUL Board of Directors Meeting Minutes 4–6 (Oct. 29, 1977),  in The 
George Huntston Williams Papers, Box 5, Folder 7, Andover-Harvard Theological 
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educational organization now focused on incremental legal 
change. 
B. Incrementalism Becomes an Overarching Plan of 
Attack 
The success of incremental litigation encouraged the 
antiabortion movement as a whole to change direction, turning 
away from efforts to amend the Constitution or create direct 
protections for a right to life. The NRLC used the victories in 
Maher and Poelker to raise as much as $30,000—an 
extraordinary amount of money for an organization reportedly 
$25,000 in debt during that period.166 Attorneys and political 
operatives across movement organizations drew on these 
victories in setting forth a new strategy. Rather than focusing 
solely on a fetal-protective Article V amendment, movement 
members began prioritizing efforts to chip away at Roe itself. 
As had been the case in Maher, Poelker, and Beal, activists 
could push through laws at the state and city level that would 
limit access to abortion.167 Then, movement attorneys could 
persuade the Supreme Court to uphold those regulations. This 
strategy would, in the words of litigator James Bopp, Jr., give 
the “states . . . considerable latitude to regulate abortions short 
of prohibition.”168 
Movement attorneys hoped to reduce the number of 
abortions performed and convince women to forswear the 
 
Library, Harvard Divinity School. 
 166. On the amount of money raised using the Maher and Poelker litigation, 
see id. at 3, 8. On the NRLC’s reported debt in the period, see CONNIE PAIGE, THE 
RIGHT TO LIFERS: WHO THEY ARE, HOW THEY OPERATE, WHERE THEY GET THEIR 
MONEY 87 (1983). 
 167. For antiabortion accounts of this strategy, see James Bopp, Jr., Akron 
Analysis, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Oct. 10, 1979, at 3, in The National Right to 
Life News Collection, 1979 Box, Dr. Joseph R. Stanton Human Life Issues Library 
and Resource Center, Sisters for Life Convent, Bronx, New York; James Bopp, Jr., 
Akron Type Laws Buoyed by Court Decisions, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, 
November 1979, at 20, in The National Right to Life News Collection, 1979 Box, 
Dr. Joseph R. Stanton Human Life Issues Library and Resource Center, Sisters 
for Life Convent, Bronx, New York; AUL Perspective, LEX VITAE, Feb. 1, 1979, at 
5–6, in The Lex Vitae Folder, Wilcox Collection, University of Kansas.  
 168. Bopp, supra note 167; see also AUL Perspective, supra note 167 (“The 
challenge, therefore, to the Right to Life movement is to enact carefully drawn 
legislation and to present sound legal argumentation in the courts in support of 
these laws.”). 
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procedure altogether. At the same time, by constantly 
undercutting and remaking the Roe decision, antiabortion 
attorneys could expose it as unworkable and constitutionally 
unsound. From start to finish, the movement would pursue 
restrictions with the “reasonable hope” that the Court would 
uphold them.169 
Subsequently, movement attorneys experimented with a 
new incremental tactic in Harris v. McRae,170 a case in which 
the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment’s ban on 
Medicaid funding for abortion was at issue.171 Activists had 
already worked to narrow Roe’s protections, but in Harris, 
movement lawyers wanted to introduce chaos into abortion 
doctrine, strengthening the case that the 1973 opinion was 
unworkable. To advance this agenda, NRLC attorneys insisted 
that Roe and its progeny had created an “undue burden 
test.”172 As the NRLC brief in Harris maintained: 
[I]f the regulation impacts upon the abortion decision, the 
Court must find as a matter of fact that this burdens an 
individual’s right to decide to . . . terminate pregnancy by 
substantially limiting access to the means of effectuating 
that decision.173 
 
 169. Ruling on Akron Abortion Ordinance Called Victory, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE 
NEWS, Oct. 10, 1979, at 1, 3, in The National Right to Life News Collection, 1979 
Box, Dr. Joseph R. Stanton Human Life Issues Library and Resource Center, 
Sisters for Life Convent, Bronx, New York.  
 170. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
 171. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 172. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Nat’l Right to Life Comm., Inc. for 
Appellees Williams and Diamond at *5–11, Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 
(1980) (No. 79-4), 1980 WL 339450. The NRLC drew on dicta in Carey v. 
Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); 
and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). See Brief as Amicus Curiae of the Nat’l 
Right to Life Comm., supra note 172, at *5–11. None of these cases clearly set 
forth an undue-burden test applicable to adult women. Both Carey and Bellotti 
involved the constitutional rights of minors. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 697–98; 
Bellotti, 428 U.S. at 147. Carey clearly required that a law be narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling government interest. Carey, 431 U.S. at 689. While Maher did 
use undue-burden rhetoric, see 432 U.S. at 487, 489, the Court insisted that it had 
in no way retreated from the approach taken in Roe itself. The NRLC’s undue-
burden argument represented a new creation rather than a straightforward gloss 
on existing precedent. 
 173. Brief as Amicus Curiae for the Nat’l Right to Life Comm., supra note 172, 
at *6 (quotation omitted). 
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NRLC attorneys first insisted that not all abortion regulations 
had anything to do with a woman’s abortion decision. So long 
as the government interfered only with doctors’ prerogatives, 
judges should apply rational basis review.174 The NRLC also 
asserted that even if a law impacted a woman’s decision, not all 
burdens were undue.175 As the NRLC reasoned, “a requirement 
for a lawful abortion is not unconstitutional unless it unduly 
burdens the right to seek an abortion.”176 If Roe’s meaning 
could be changed, abortion opponents hoped to argue more 
effectively that the decision was incoherent. 
After Harris upheld the Hyde Amendment,177 abortion 
opponents redoubled their commitment to hollowing out Roe’s 
protections. The movement pursued a two-part strategy. First, 
movement attorneys would convince the Court to narrow the 
right set out in the 1973 decision. At the same time, as abortion 
doctrine became increasingly unstable, advocates would 
highlight the activism of the Court, putting more pressure on 
the justices to undermine abortion rights or reject them 
altogether. For example, in 1981, NRLC leader John Willke 
denounced the activism of the Roe Court.178 “The Supreme 
Court’s 1973 abortion decision had no authentic basis in the 
Constitution,” Willke asserted.179 “Rather, it constituted the 
most extreme example of ‘judicial activism’ in this century.”180 
Starting in 1983, similar arguments played a central role 
in movement litigation, after antiabortion attorneys defended 
an Akron, Ohio, ordinance designed to survive judicial 
scrutiny.181 The ordinance included measures requiring that 
 
 174. See id. at *6–11. 
 175. See id. 
 176. Id. at *7 (quotation omitted). 
 177. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316–17 (1980). 
 178. See Nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor: Hearings Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 334 (1981) (statement of Dr. John Willke). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Abortion opponents submitted several amicus briefs in the Akron case. 
See Brief as Amicus Curiae of Feminists for Life in Support of Petitioner, City of 
Akron, City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health (Akron I), 462 U.S. 416 
(1983) (No. 81-746), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 150; Brief of Amicus Curiae of 
the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights in Support of the Petitioner in 
No. 81–746 and the Respondent in No. 81–1172, Akron I, 462 U.S. 416, 1982 U.S. 
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 152; Brief as Amicus Curiae of Womankind, Inc. in Support of 
Petitioner, City of Akron, Akron I, 462 U.S. 416 (No. 81-746), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 1498; Brief as Amicus Curiae of Ams. United for Life in Support of 
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first-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital, mandating 
parental consultation and informed consent, setting forth a 
waiting period, and regulating the disposal of fetal tissue.182 
Although the Court in Akron I struck down major parts of the 
challenged ordinance,183 Sandra Day O’Connor dissented, 
picking up on the undue-burden framework articulated by 
movement attorneys.184 In a dissent joined by Justices 
Rehnquist and White, Justice O’Connor contended: “The 
‘unduly burdensome’ standard is particularly appropriate in 
the abortion context because of the nature and scope of the 
right that is involved.”185 Importantly, O’Connor reiterated 
movement arguments that Roe was unworkable, reinforcing 
the view that the best way forward for the antiabortion 
movement was through the courts.186 
C. The Antiabortion Movement Lays the Groundwork for 
Overruling Roe 
The more success antiabortion litigators enjoyed, the more 
activists inside and outside of court emphasized the flaws of 
the Roe decision and the tyranny of the judiciary, aligning the 
movement with conservatives who were already upset about 
big government. In the aftermath of Akron I, the undue-burden 
test played an increasingly prominent role in the effort to get 
rid of Roe. Convincing the Court to rely on such a test would 
give states more latitude in restricting abortion. At the same 
time, by muddying abortion doctrine, antiabortion attorneys 
hoped to build a case for overruling Roe. Antiabortion 
attorneys—increasingly supported by the Reagan 
Administration—used the Court’s inconsistent treatment of 
abortion laws as a justification for setting aside the Roe 
decision. The Court’s very willingness to adopt the undue-
burden test showed that Roe was unworkable—that the 
doctrine the justices applied was unsound and in need of 
 
Petitioner, City of Akron, Akron I, 462 U.S. 416 (No. 81-746), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 1499.  
 182. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 422–25.  
 183. Id. at 452. 
 184. See id. at 452–73 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 185. Id. at 463. 
 186. See id. at 458 (concluding that “[t]he Roe framework, then, is clearly on a 
collision course with itself”).  
ZIEGLER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/19/2015  10:09 AM 
2015] IDENTITY CONTESTS 1313 
 
constant revision. The movement’s litigation strategy played up 
the irresponsibility and activism of the Court. As the 
movement put more emphasis on litigation, movement 
members already interested in aligning with the Republican 
Party and the political Right exercised more influence. 
An amicus brief submitted on behalf of the United States 
highlighted Roe’s unworkability during the 1981 litigation of 
Akron I,187 but efforts to destabilize Roe came most clearly to 
the surface in 1988, when the Court agreed to hear Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services.188 Like Danforth, Webster 
involved a multi-part Missouri abortion regulation, but a great 
deal had changed since 1976.189 Ronald Reagan and George 
H.W. Bush had reshaped the Court, and those justices still 
strongly supportive of abortion rights—including Blackmun 
and Brennan—seemed close to retirement.190 The Justice 
Department gave a ringing endorsement to arguments about 
Roe’s overreaching,191 as did powerful and well-funded New 
Right and Religious Right organizations.192 It seemed that the 
time had come to expose Roe’s supposed flaws and ask openly 
for its overruling. 
The NRLC again took the lead in this effort, insisting that 
the Court once and for all reject its reasoning in Roe. “Failure 
to confront the issue of Roe’s viability,” the NRLC noted, 
“would lead to . . . continued, interminable litigation of the 
 
 187. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners 
at *6–15, Akron I, 462 U.S. 416 (No. 81-746), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1544. 
 188. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 189. For the statute at issue in Webster, see id. at 498–504. 
 190. On contemporary perceptions that Webster would overrule Roe, see 
HOWARD BALL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE INTIMATE LIVES OF AMERICANS: 
BIRTH, SEX, CHILDREARING, AND DEATH 104 (2002); LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH 
KOBLYKLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY 295–98 (1992). 
 191. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants 
at *1, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88–605), 1989 
WL 1127640 (“The United States continues to believe that Roe v. Wade unduly 
restricts the proper sphere of legislative authority in this area and should be 
overruled by this Court.”).  
 192. For examples of the briefs submitted by Religious Right and New Right 
organizations in Webster, see Brief as Amicus Curiae of the Ctr. for Judicial 
Studies et al. in Support of Appellants, Webster, 492 U.S. 490 (No. 88–605), 1989 
WL 1127626; Brief as Amicus Curiae of Am. Family Ass’n, Inc. in Support of 
Appellants, Webster, 492 U.S. 490 (No. 88–605), 1989 WL 1127633; Brief as Amici 
Curiae of Focus on the Family et al. in Support of Appellants, Webster, 492 U.S. 
490 (No. 88–605), 1989 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1543.  
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subject of abortion in this and lower courts.”193 The 
antiabortion movement’s very preoccupation with litigation 
became an argument for overruling Roe: anything less would 
leave the Court to confront more challenges led by antiabortion 
attorneys. In the NRLC’s analysis, the doctrinal uncertainty 
surrounding abortion—something very much pursued by 
antiabortion litigators—reflected the fundamental flaws in Roe. 
“Rather than making the lines of abortion procedure clearer,” 
the NRLC argued, “the decisions of this Court have made the 
‘bright lines’ of Roe blurred.”194 
Significantly, arguments about Roe’s incoherence 
resonated with a powerful group of allies, including Republican 
political leaders and New Right movement organizations. 
Recently-formed Religious Right organizations like Focus on 
the Family and the Family Research Council adopted the 
NRLC’s reasoning wholeheartedly in Webster, arguing: “Roe v. 
Wade embarked this Court on a road of legislative line 
drawing, scientific and medical review, and judicial rulemaking 
unmoored to constitutional reasoning.”195 Amicus briefs 
submitted on behalf of the Justice Department and individual 
members of Congress followed a similar approach.196 
Success in court created a kind of strategic path 
dependence for a movement desperate for signs of progress. In 
trying to replicate the results of Maher, Poelker, and Beal, 
leading antiabortion activists privileged efforts to chip away at 
Roe and expose its flaws.197 The more the movement committed 
to arguments about judicial overreaching, the more abortion 
opponents could align with newly mobilized social 
conservatives angry about recent decisions of the Supreme 
Court.198 
Right-leaning Americans had protested against perceived 
judicial tyranny since the Warren Court’s decisions on school 
 
 193. Brief as Amicus Curiae of the Nat’l Right to Life Comm., Inc. in Support 
of Appellants at *11, Webster, 492 U.S. 490 (No. 88-605), 1989 WL 1127669. 
 194. Id. at *14. 
 195. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at *1, 
Webster, 492 U.S. 490 (No. 88–605), 1989 WL 1127640. 
 196. See id. at 1; Brief as Amici Curiae of Hon. Chris Smith et al. in Support of 
Appellants at *10, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-
605), 1989 WL 1127607 (“Roe has proven to be inherently difficult to apply in any 
consistent and principled manner.”).  
 197. See supra Part III. 
 198. See supra Part III. 
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prayer and criminal procedure. They had flooded the Supreme 
Court with letters of protest and even demanded the 
impeachment of Chief Justice Earl Warren.199 When the 
federal courts began mandating intra- and inter-district busing 
as a remedy for school segregation, protesters again 
highlighted supposed judicial overreaching.200 By the early 
1980s, together with Ronald Reagan, Paul Weyrich’s New 
Right united single-issue groups behind opposition to the 
damage done by “big government.”201 In a 1980 speech, for 
example, Reagan asserted that leaders of the federal 
government had “begun to think they can be parent; they can 
be teacher; they can be clergyman. And I think it is time to get 
the Government back to what it was supposed to be 200 years 
ago, and that is a servant of the people.”202 Reagan’s message 
attracted grassroots conservatives concerned about “sex 
education in public schools, court rulings that have prohibited 
prayers in the schools and regulations that allow teen-age girls 
to have abortions without their parents’ knowledge.”203 
Strategically, identifying a common enemy allowed social 
conservatives, in the words of one activist, to “get a lot more 
accomplished.”204 The New Right offered political expertise, 
access to direct mail networks, and financial stability to 
previously struggling single-issue groups.205 United, social 
 
 199. On efforts to impeach Earl Warren, see CHRISTINE L. COMPSTON, EARL 
WARREN: JUSTICE FOR ALL 130 (2001); G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A 
PUBLIC LIFE 247–48 (1982). On protests of the Warren Court’s school prayer 
decisions, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION 
HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 261–67 (2009); DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, GOD’S OWN PARTY: THE 
MAKING OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 62–67 (2d ed. 2012). 
 200. On the busing protests, see generally RONALD P. FORMISANO, BOSTON 
AGAINST BUSING: RACE, CLASS, AND ETHNICITY IN THE 1960S AND 1970S (2d ed. 
2012); JONATHAN RIEDER, CANARSIE: THE JEWS AND ITALIANS OF BROOKLYN 
AGAINST LIBERALISM 2–3, 207–32 (1985). 
 201. See Mary Ziegler, The Politics of Constitutional Federalism, 91 DENV. U. 
L. REV. ONLINE 217, 223 (2014). 
 202. David E. Rosenbaum, Conservatives Embrace Reagan on Social Issues, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1980, at B12. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Leslie Bennetts, Conservatives Join on Social Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 30, 
1980, at B6. 
 205. On the pragmatic reasons antiabortion activists had  for partnering with 
the New Right, see WILLIAMS, supra note 199, at 169–70; Mary Ziegler, Women’s 
Rights on the Right: The History and Stakes of Modern Pro-life Feminism, 28 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 232, 248–54 (2013) [hereinafter Ziegler, Women’s 
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conservatives appeared to have greater political influence. 
Moreover, the message advanced by Reagan and New Right 
leaders like Weyrich appealed to a variety of movement 
conservatives “concerned that the federal government [had] 
intruded in a massive way into such areas that concern them 
as the family, religion, and the home.”206 “The bottom line of 
pro-family people,” explained anti-feminist Phyllis Schlafly, “is 
get the federal government off our backs.”207 
Throughout the 1970s, abortion opponents had remained 
largely on the sidelines of the academic and popular struggle 
over judicial restraint.208 Indeed, movement members—divided 
by their views on the meaning of their cause and the goals they 
should pursue—generally agreed that the courts should go 
beyond the text and history of the Constitution in identifying 
constitutional rights, a move widely derided by critics of 
judicial activism.209 The more abortion opponents fixated on an 
incrementalist litigation strategy, the closer the movement 
grew to other popular movements against supposed judicial 
overreach. In 1987, for example, when Reagan nominated 
Robert Bork to the Supreme Court, the National Right to Life 
News reported: 
The certainty of Bork-bashing by the abortionists has 
nothing to do with Judge Bork’s personal views, which are 
unknown. Rather it has everything to do with his oft-
repeated view that judges must exercise self-restraint, 
particularly in resisting the temptation to create “rights” 
not mentioned in the Constitution.210 
 
Rights on the Right: The History and Stakes of Modern Pro-life Feminism]; Mary 
Ziegler, The Possibility of Compromise: Anti-Abortion Moderates After Roe v. 
Wade, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 588 (2012) [hereinafter Ziegler, The Possibility 
of Compromise: Anti-Abortion Moderates After Roe v. Wade]. 
 206. Bennetts, supra note 204, at A1. 
 207. Id. 
 208. See generally Ziegler, Women’s Rights on the Right: The History and 
Stakes of Modern Pro-life Feminism, supra note 205; Ziegler, The Possibility of 
Compromise: Anti-Abortion Moderates After Roe v. Wade, supra note 205. 
 209. See id. 
 210. Bork Nomination Draws Massive Pro-Abortion Fire, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE 
NEWS, Jul. 16, 1987, at 1, in The National Right to Life News Collection, 1987 
Box, Dr. Joseph R. Stanton Human Life Issues Library and Resource Center, 
Sisters for Life Convent, Bronx, New York. 
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In 1988, in the aftermath of Bork’s failed nomination, the 
National Right to Life News reiterated that theirs was a fight 
against judicial activism: 
A pro-life President can appoint judges who will honestly 
interpret the Constitution and reverse Roe v. Wade, putting 
the issue in the legislative arena where the pro-life 
movement has demonstrated against incredible odds that it 
can win.211 
Movement preoccupation with incremental litigation 
strengthened the hand of those who identified their cause with 
the political right. Convinced that a fetal-protective 
amendment was out of reach, abortion opponents directed more 
and more attention to convincing the courts to reject or gut the 
Roe decision. If activists could not remake the Constitution, 
they hoped to transform the courts. Again, the most promising 
path seemed to lie with an alliance with critics of supposed 
judicial overreaching. However, as section D shows, litigation 
alone did not guarantee that abortion opponents would partner 
with the Right and the Republican Party. Since the 1970s, 
Republican operatives had worked to use abortion as a wedge 
issue, thereby wooing certain Catholic and Southern voters 
who had conventionally sided with the Democratic Party. In 
part, the alliance between abortion opponents and members of 
the Right represented the culmination of a longstanding 
campaign to expand the Republican base. At the same time, as 
the antiabortion movement struggled to shore up its finances 
and increase its influence, aligning with the Right seemed to be 
the most pragmatic choice. Abortion opponents focused so 
much on litigation partly because changes to the larger 
political climate made a partnership with the Right more 
realistic and valuable. 
D. Litigation Plays a Part in a Much More Complex Story 
Understanding how antiabortion litigators forged a 
 
 211. David N. O’Steen & Darla St. Martin, What’s At Stake for Babies in 1988, 
NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Jan. 1988, at 1, in The National Right to Life News 
Collection, 1988 Box, Dr. Joseph R. Stanton Human Life Issues Library and 
Resource Center, Sisters for Life Convent, Bronx, New York. 
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strategy attractive to the political Right requires an account of 
the larger political and social circumstances that solidified the 
relationship between the antiabortion movement and social 
conservatives. Antiabortion litigators had such success in 
building alliances with the Right partly because Republicans 
had consistently pursued antiabortion supporters. Moreover, in 
the aftermath of political party realignment, a financially-
strapped antiabortion movement needed the support promised 
by a partnership with opponents of big government. 
In part, abortion opponents turned to incremental 
litigation because they found a receptive audience in 
Republican and conservative strategists already courting 
Catholics and others who were uncomfortable with legal 
abortion. Starting in 1972, Richard Nixon tried to lure 
Catholics away from the Democratic Party, accusing his 
opponent, George McGovern, of supporting acid, amnesty, and 
abortion.212 Later in the decade, as right-wing operatives 
worked to force the Republican Party to endorse more 
conservative policies, Paul Weyrich, an architect of the New 
Right, viewed abortion as a promising wedge issue.213 
At the same time, political party realignment made an 
alliance with conservatives the only realistic option for an 
isolated antiabortion movement. As late as 1976, neither major 
presidential candidate (nor either party platform) had taken a 
strong stand on abortion.214 By 1980, with Ronald Reagan at 
the helm, the Republican Party endorsed both a fetal-protective 
amendment and Medicaid funding bans.215 In the same period, 
because of an ever-closer relationship with the women’s 
 
 212. See Donald T. Critchlow, Birth Control, Population Control, and Family 
Planning: An Overview, in THE POLITICS OF ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 82, at 14.  
 213. See Chip Berlet, The New Political Right in the United States: Reaction, 
Rollback, and Resentment, in CONFRONTING THE NEW CONSERVATISM: THE RISE 
OF THE RIGHT IN AMERICA 84–85 (Michael Thompson ed., 2007). 
 214. On the 1976 Democratic Platform, see Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, 
Democratic Party Platform of 1976, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29606 (last visited Jan. 27, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/GU5Y-FPVU. For the Republican Party Platform, see 
Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Republican Party Platform of 1976, AM. 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25843 (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8RQU-RW94.  
 215. See Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Republican Party Platform of 
1980, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25844 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/22EZ-DHJB. 
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movement, the Democratic Party and incumbent Jimmy Carter 
supported Roe as the law of the land.216 An alliance with critics 
of judicial activism—already attractive because of the 
movement’s commitment to litigation—seemed to be the only 
viable strategy for an antiabortion movement seeking political 
relevance. A partnership with social conservatives also 
promised financial stability to a movement struggling to stay 
out of debt. Even the NRLC, the largest and most influential 
antiabortion organization, was in serious debt at a time when 
the Moral Majority, a Religious Right organization founded in 
1979, boasted a $6 million budget.217 The resources available 
through the New Right and Religious Right seemed 
particularly crucial when many in the antiabortion movement 
despaired of passing a fetal-protective amendment to the 
Constitution in the near term. 
In 1982, with the movement claiming a majority in 
Congress and support in the White House, abortion opponents 
celebrated when a federalism amendment—one that would 
have allowed Congress and the states to restrict abortion—
made it out of congressional committee for the first time.218 
However, with antiabortion activists deeply divided over 
whether the amendment went far enough, Republicans could 
not find the votes to overcome a filibuster led by Senator 
 
 216. See Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Democratic Party Platform of 
1980, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29607 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9ZF3-Y8ZR. As Linda 
Greenhouse and Reva Siegel have shown, the process of party realignment began 
before the Roe decision. Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) 
Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2052–78 (2011); 
see also Thomas J. Sugrue & John Skrentny, The White Ethnic Strategy, in 
RIGHTWARD BOUND: MAKING AMERICA CONSERVATIVE IN THE 1970S 174–75 
(Bruce J. Shulman & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2008); CHRISTINA WOLBRECHT, THE 
POLITICS OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS: PARTIES, POSITIONS, AND CHANGE 40–71 (2000). 
 217. On the NRLC’s reported debt in the period, see PAIGE, supra note 166, at 
87. On the Moral Majority’s operating budget in the late 1970s, see DAN GILGOFF, 
THE JESUS MACHINE: HOW JAMES DOBSON, FOCUS ON THE FAMILY, AND 
EVANGELICAL AMERICA ARE WINNING THE CULTURE WAR 82–83 (2008). For more 
on the wealth accumulated by Religious Right organizations, see Maxwell Glen, 
The Electronic Ministers Listen to the Gospel According to the Candidates, NAT’L 
J., Dec. 22, 1979, at 2142–45. 
 218. See Bernard Weinraub, Abortion Curbs Endorsed, 10-7, by Senate Panel, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1982, at A1. For background on the federalism amendment 
introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), see Leslie Bennetts, Antiabortion 
Forces in Disarray Less Than a Year After Victories in Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
22, 1981, at B5.  
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Robert Packwood (R-OR).219 When the Senate voted down a 
second federalism proposal by a vote of 49-50-1, frustrated 
activists began looking for an alternative solution.220 
With a constitutional amendment out of reach, many 
abortion opponents concluded that progress would come only 
with the remaking of the Supreme Court. In the late 1970s, 
AUL leader Dennis Horan reported that Jimmy Carter had 
blacklisted antiabortion candidates when filling federal judicial 
vacancies, further convincing abortion opponents of the 
importance of influencing presidential elections and judicial 
selections.221 Ellen McCormack, a one-time antiabortion 
presidential candidate, agreed that the courts represented the 
movement’s best chance for constitutional change.222 The 
movement needed to ensure that “[p]ro-abortion forces” no 
longer had “more impact than pro-life forces in the judicial 
selection process.”223 
Just the same, the movement’s investment in litigation 
made a substantial difference to abortion opponents’ struggles 
over identity, coalition building, and legal priorities. By 
delivering tangible results, the movement’s incremental 
approach—even applied outside the courts—attracted 
adherents who would not have otherwise embraced social 
conservatism. In a closely divided movement, the promise of 
progress made all the difference. 
In the new world of abortion politics that litigators helped 
to create, those antiabortion activists who favored welfare 
rights struggled to find a place. Some, like Marjory 
 
 219. On the filibuster, see Robert Pear, Filibuster Starts Abortion Debate, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1982, at A18; Robert Pear, Baker Sets Vote After Labor Day on 
Ending Filibuster on Abortion and School Prayer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1982, at 9; 
Steven V. Roberts, Senate Kills Plan to Curb Abortion by a Vote of 47-46, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 16, 1982, at A1. 
 220. On the failure of the Hatch-Eagleton Amendment, see NAT’L COMM. FOR A 
HUMAN LIFE AMENDMENT, HUMAN LIFE AMENDMENT: MAJOR TEXTS 1–2 (2004), 
available at http://www.nchla.org/datasource/idocuments/HLAmajortexts.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/WK94-8XEL. 
 221. See Federal Judgeships Denied to Pro-Lifers, Says Horan, NAT’L RIGHT TO 
LIFE NEWS, Feb. 1979, at 17, in The National Right to Life News Collection, 1979 
Box, Dr. Joseph R. Stanton Human Life Issues Library and Resource Center, 
Sisters for Life Convent, Bronx, New York. 
 222. See Ellen McCormack, Can Right to Life Do Anything About the Power of 
the Courts?, ELLEN MCCORMACK REP., Jan. 1978, at 1, 6, in The Ellen 
McCormack Report Folder, Wilcox Collection, University of Kansas.  
 223. Id. at 5. 
ZIEGLER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/19/2015  10:09 AM 
2015] IDENTITY CONTESTS 1321 
 
Mecklenburg, discounted their earlier positions. Reagan 
selected Mecklenburg to head the Office of Family Planning 
Programs in the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, and Mecklenburg largely set aside her earlier support 
for birth control, promoting abstinence-centered education as 
an alternative.224 Other activists maintained their earlier 
constitutional commitments but rarely shaped the conversation 
within the larger antiabortion movement.225 
Social conservatives’ fight against big government left 
little room for the protections for poor and vulnerable persons 
that were once demanded by antiabortion activists. The 
Reagan Administration committed to dismantling a welfare 
state that it viewed as inefficient and counterproductive.226 
Whereas some abortion opponents had argued that dependent 
and vulnerable persons had a right to more protection from the 
State, the Reagan Administration called on Americans to 
“escape the spider’s web of dependency.”227 Reagan’s dramatic 
 
 224. On Mecklenburg’s nomination, see ALEXANDRA M. LORD, CONDOM 
NATION: THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S SEX EDUCATION CAMPAIGN FROM WORLD WAR I 
TO THE INTERNET 143 (2010). While working for Reagan, Mecklenburg proposed a 
“squeal rule,” requiring all federally funded clinics to report immediately if any 
adolescent requested contraception. See STEVE CHAPPLE & DAVID TALBOT, 
BURNING DESIRES: SEX IN AMERICA 79 (1989). The Reagan Administration first 
proposed the squeal rule in 1982, and in February 1983, a federal district court 
held that it was unlawful. See Associated Press, U. S. Plans to Appeal Ruling on 
Teen-Ager Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1983, at A21. When an appeals 
court affirmed this ruling, the Reagan Administration gave up on the squeal rule. 
See Marjorie Hunter, Court Blocks Rule on Notice by Family Planning Clinics, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 9, 1983, at 5 (noting the first of four appeals-court decisions 
ruling against the squeal rule); U.S. Drops Efforts for Notice of Child’s Birth 
Control Use, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1983, at B13. Mecklenburg also reportedly 
oversaw the Adolescent Family Life Act of 1981 (AFLA), a grant program 
designed to curb adolescent pregnancy rates. In guiding the selection of AFLA 
reviewers and grantees, Mecklenburg supposedly promoted a policy vision that 
was both antiabortion and anti-birth control. JANICE M. IRVINE, TALK ABOUT SEX: 
THE BATTLES OVER SEX EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 88–97 (2002).  
 225. Groups like Consistent Life and All Our Lives continue to seek common 
ground on issues like the death penalty, contraception, equal pay for women, and 
nuclear proliferation. See, e.g., Ziegler, Women’s Rights on the Right: The History 
and Stakes of Modern Pro-life Feminism, supra note 205, at 262–63. 
 226. On Reagan’s commitment to reshaping the welfare state, see STEVEN F. 
HAYWARD, THE AGE OF REAGAN: THE FALL OF THE OLD LIBERAL ORDER 245–46 
(2001); DANIEL BÉLAND & ALEX WADDAN, THE POLITICS OF POLICY CHANGE: 
WELFARE, MEDICARE, AND SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 44 
(2012). 
 227. Ronald Reagan, U.S. President, Address Before a Joint Session of 
Congress on the State of the Union (Feb. 4, 1986), available at 
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budget cuts—a 17.4 percent reduction in funding for the AFDC 
and a 14.3 percent cut to the Food Stamp program—shrank the 
social safety net.228 Closely aligned with the Right, even those 
abortion opponents who defined themselves as champions of 
rights for the poor stood little chance of expanding the welfare 
state. 
The movement’s embrace of mainstream conservative 
politics alienated some hardliners who were persuaded that the 
movement had not done enough to reverse the sexual 
revolution, with the absolutists in the movement worrying that 
a court-centered strategy did too little to challenge lax sexual 
mores or to ban abortion outright. Organizations like Judie 
Brown’s American Life League (ALL) and Joseph Scheidler’s 
Pro-Life Action League took issue with the mainstream 
movement’s emphasis on gradual progress. Brown and her 
allies pledged to “continue our support for only that legislation 
which recognizes the need for personhood to be extended to the 
preborn child.”229 Scheidler stepped up protests and “sidewalk 
counseling” outside of abortion clinics, paving the way for 
massive “rescue” protests in the late 1980s.230 Absolutists, as 
Judie Brown explained, rejected the idea that incremental 
statutes had become the “only avenue open to [the pro-life 
movement] at the time ‘politically.’”231 If incrementalism 
prevailed, politicians could claim to be pro-life without ever 
delivering the kinds of legal protections the movement truly 
demanded. As an ally of Brown’s explained, if legislators 
defeated compromise laws, “it would be easy to say that 
nothing is ‘possible’ so we must accept defeat and ‘get on’ to 
other things.”232 
 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=36646, archived at http://perma.cc/P9BZ-
S3TT. 
 228. See JAMES PETRAS & MORRIS MORLEY, EMPIRE OR REPUBLIC?: AMERICAN 
GLOBAL POWER AND DOMESTIC DECAY 91 (1995).  
 229. President’s Column: Personhood, Please, A.L.L. ABOUT ISSUES, Jan. 1982, 
at 1, in The A.L.L. About Issues Folder, Wilcox Collection, University of Kansas.  
 230. See RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 117, at 105–17. For Scheidler’s 
perspective on antiabortion strategy, see JOSEPH SCHEIDLER, CLOSED: 99 WAYS 
TO STOP ABORTION (1985). 
 231. President’s Column: Beware of False Friends, A.L.L. ABOUT ISSUES, Sept. 
1981, in The A.L.L. About Issues Folder, Wilcox Collection, University of Kansas. 
 232. James Schall, Political Wrong Turn Disheartens Pro-Lifers, A.L.L. ABOUT 
ISSUES, Apr. 1982, 3, in The A.L.L. About Issues Folder, Wilcox Collection, 
University of Kansas. 
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Absolutists like Brown helped to create a schism in the 
movement not only by questioning the ideology of mainstream 
groups but also by relying more often on direct action protest. 
Over the course of the late 1980s and early 1990s, protestors 
blockaded 525 clinics, and law enforcement officials arrested 
over 31,000 pro-life protestors.233 The fault line in the 
antiabortion movement carried forward into the early 2010s, as 
absolutists mounted state campaigns for constitutional 
amendments recognizing fetal personhood.234 Frustrated again 
with the gradual progress promised by incrementalism, 
hardliners accused movement leaders of cowardice. Veteran 
absolutist Judie Brown attacked opponents of the personhood 
strategy for being “political [and] gutless.”235 “As a Catholic,” 
she said, “[opposing a personhood strategy is] the most 
scandalous thing I’ve ever heard.”236 
The story of antiabortion litigation adds a new dimension 
to studies of law and social change. As Part IV explores, the 
case study developed in this article offers an opportunity to 
reconsider the costs for social movements of either winning in 
court or relying on legal rights. 
IV. LITIGATION POLITICS 
History offers an entry point into larger conversations 
about law and social change. While still spotlighting litigation, 
what Risa Goluboff calls the “new” legal history takes a 
different path—identifying multiple interpreters of law outside 
the courts and studying the difficulties inherent in the 
 
 233. See Mary C. Segers, The Pro-Choice Movement Post-Casey: Preserving 
Access, in ABORTION POLITICS IN AMERICAN STATES 233 (Timothy Byrnes & Mary 
Segers eds., 1995). For more on anti-clinic protest and violence, see WENDY 
SIMONDS, ABORTION AT WORK: IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE IN A FEMINIST CLINIC 7–
9 (1996). 
 234. For further discussion of contemporary conflict about the personhood 
movement, see Lauren Markoe, After Mississippi Defeat, What About 
Personhood?, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Dec. 13, 2011, at 18; Cheryl Wetzstein, State 
Abortion Curbs Rose in ‘11, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2012, at A6 (detailing 
personhood battles in states like Mississippi and Colorado); Erik Eckholm, The 
Christian Vote: “Personhood” Issue Hangs On, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2011, at A22 
(explaining that the personhood movement was still active in spite of major defeat 
in Mississippi). 
 235. James T. McCafferty, The Perils of Promoting Personhood, 79 NEW 
OXFORD REV. 23, 24 (2012). 
 236. Id.  
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interactions between social movements and attorneys.237 
Litigation often figures centrally in these stories, as lawyers 
modify and sometimes narrow the claims of those they 
represent.238 
As the history of antiabortion lawyering suggests, 
litigation can also shift the balance of power in contests 
between lay actors. Historians and legal scholars view the 
advantages of litigation with some skepticism. Scholars like 
Derrick Bell and William Rubenstein explore how the 
individual interests vindicated in lawsuits can crowd out other 
voices in large and diverse movements.239 By focusing on the 
attorney-client relationship, historians like Risa Goluboff and 
Kenneth Mack explore how litigation can overshadow certain 
demands for change, including those involving socioeconomic 
rights.240 
Without disputing the drawbacks of litigation, legal 
mobilization scholars highlight its important indirect effects.241 
Litigation can help to mobilize new movement members and 
energize those who have already joined the cause.242 Moreover, 
activists use litigation to increase the salience of their cause, 
raise funds from foundations and allies, build influence over 
government officials, convince the public, and sway elites.243 
 
 237. See Risa Goluboff, Lawyers, Law, and the New Civil Rights History, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2322–23 (2013). 
 238. See id. at 2323 (summarizing current historical literature and arguing 
that the new studies “practice[] a history that emphasizes connections between 
laypeople and formal law—one that understands lawyers as mediators, 
facilitators, and gatekeepers”). 
 239. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN 
LABOR MOVEMENT 98–127 (1991); Derrick A. Bell, Serving Two Masters: 
Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 
YALE L.J. 470, 476–77 (1976). 
 240. See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 1, at 7–9; GOLUBOFF, supra note 1, at 11–
15; Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era 
Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256, 258 (2005). 
 241. For discussions of legal mobilization scholarship, see Douglas NeJaime, 
Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 969–79 (2011); Ben Depoorter, 
The Upside of Losing, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 817, 829–40 (2013).  
 242. See JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A 
THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 218 (1978); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, 
RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL 
MOBILIZATION 58 (1994); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: 
LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 147 (Univ. of Mich. Press 2d 
ed. 2004) (1974); Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of 
Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 151, 156–57 (2009). 
 243. See NeJaime, supra note 241, at 969–79; Depoorter, supra note 241, at 
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Like legal mobilization scholarship, this study looks at 
litigation’s indirect impact litigation. However, while legal 
mobilization scholars often expose the value of court-centered 
tactics, the history studied here showcases indirect effects that 
are less obviously beneficial, or even harmful, to a movement. 
This study also reinforces the conclusion that litigation can 
reframe a cause, and the strategies used to pursue it, as legal 
tactics and arguments gain favor. As this Article shows, court-
centered strategies influence more than the interactions of 
lawyers and those they represent. Because of the progress 
litigation promises, it can break the deadlock—defining 
struggles between lay members over identity, coalition 
building, and policy objectives. 
A. The Perils of Progress 
Recent legal scholarship makes a compelling case that 
losing in court can have unexpected consequences.244 Far from 
setting a movement back, litigation losses can help a movement 
stake out an identity.245 Failure appears to energize activists 
who are convinced that counter-majoritarian courts improperly 
intervened.246 When courts refuse to act aggressively to create 
the desired change, movements can more effectively seek a 
remedy from legislatures, building on a traditional narrative 
about the limitations of court-centered strategies.247 
In contrast, some commentators are often deeply skeptical 
about the indirect benefits of court-centered strategies. 
According to these scholars, judicial victories can trigger 
damaging backlashes.248 To win in court, movements use up 
 
829–40. 
 244. See NeJaime, supra note 241, at 971–1007; Depoorter, supra note 241, at 
829–40. 
 245. E.g., NeJaime, supra note 241, at 969–70, 979–80.  
 246. See id. at 986, 1006–07. 
 247. See id. at 986–87, 1006; Depoorter, supra note 241, at 818–19. 
 248. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, 
BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 166 (2013) (“Not only do 
court decisions make people aware of previously unnoticed social change and force 
politicians to take positions on issues they may have ducked, but they also force 
substantive resolutions of policy issues that may be very different from those 
supported by many voters. It is this aspect of judicial decisions that is the most 
important cause of backlash.”); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN 
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 425 (2d ed. 2008); Michael J. Klarman, 
Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 473 
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precious resources.249 By creating a false sense of security, 
litigation can deradicalize movements, undermining the energy 
that forces change.250 Such victories can legitimize a generally 
unjust system.251 By directing attention to court-centered 
strategies, litigation can also marginalize the movement’s 
radical wing and empower the elites.252 
By studying the history of antiabortion litigation, we can 
see that the indirect benefits associated with litigation come 
with costs of their own. Court-centered strategies can create 
substantial path dependence. For both movement elites and 
many grassroots radicals, the progress promised by litigation 
proved irresistible. Success in court did not simply undercut 
more effective tactics or silence the movement’s radical wing. 
Rather, litigation victories also convinced a diverse group of 
movement leaders to develop different approaches to lobbying, 
street protests, and media work. The more the movement won, 
the more  activists committed to a strategy centered on judicial 
activism. Defining this tactic as less radical than those pursued 
earlier seems to miss an important part of the story. On the 
one hand, abortion opponents strengthened their relationship 
with social conservatives invested in a broad attack on changes 
to sexual mores and family structures. On the other hand, the 
movement gradually cast away transformative arguments for a 
larger welfare state. 
Instead of deradicalizing the movement, winning in court 
gradually blinded abortion opponents to alternative identities, 
legal goals, and rhetorical tactics. This path dependence had 
important opportunity costs. As antiabortion activists invested 
 
(2005) (arguing that court rulings cause backlash because “they alter the order in 
which social change would otherwise have occurred”). 
 249. See Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law’s 
“Allurements”: A Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United 
States, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES 261, 261–92 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 
1998); ROSENBERG, supra note 248, at 10–12, 420–29; SCHEINGOLD, supra note 
242, at 49–53. 
 250. See FORBATH, supra note 239, at 128–36; Bell, supra note 239, at 476–77, 
515–16; Sandra R. Levitsky, To Lead with Law: Reassessing the Influence of Legal 
Advocacy Organizations in Social Movements, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS 145, 145–63 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006). 
 251. See Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Litigation as a Social Movement 
Strategy, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 61, 64–66 (2011).  
 252. See, e.g., Levitsky, supra note 250, at 157; Albiston, supra note 251, at 74–
75. 
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in a litigation-driven strategy, previously appealing options, 
like those involving welfare legislation or protections for 
pregnant women, gradually became less relevant or even 
politically out of reach. By relying so heavily on one strategy, 
one political party, and one set of allies, antiabortion activists 
lost some of the flexibility and creativity that had defined the 
early years of the movement. Increasingly, the movement rose 
or fell with the fortunes of its partners on the Right. 
At the same time, by helping to decide winners and losers 
in the struggle over movement identity, litigation victories 
marginalized influential movement strategists who were 
disturbed by the direction the cause had taken. Moreover, 
success in court further radicalized movement hardliners who 
believed that their colleagues had taken a wrong turn. 
Divisions between incrementalists and absolutists hobbled the 
movement’s efforts to achieve constitutional change. By 
committing so much to a single strategy, the movement became 
more homogenous, drawing supporters from fewer 
communities. 
Victory in court delivered just the kind of indirect benefit 
long spotlighted by legal mobilization scholars. Just the same, 
the movement’s investment in litigation successes foreclosed 
other valuable political opportunities, pushing under the 
surface alternative demands for change. 
B. Decoupling Rights Talk and Litigation 
Critics of social-change litigation take aim not only at 
court-centered strategies but also at rights rhetoric. These 
commentators argue that rights-based strategies can 
deradicalize a movement, encouraging activists to seek a 
legally viable remedy rather than what members actually 
want.253 At the same time, by prioritizing rights talk, 
movement members may set aside demands—particularly, 
those for redistributive remedies and economic justice—that fit 
poorly within a constitutional framework.254 When movements 
 
 253. For discussion of the deradicalizing effect of both litigation and rights-
claiming, see FORBATH, supra note 239 at 128–36; Albiston, supra note 251, at 
64–66; Bell, supra note 239, at 476–77, 515–16; Levitsky, supra note 250, at 145–
63. 
 254. See William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 
38 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1440 (1986) (“A distinctive influence of the private rights 
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succeed in securing rights, moreover, their rights-claiming may 
legitimize an unjust system, demobilizing those who believe 
that the struggle is over.255 
Historians have added nuance to the story of rights 
rhetoric, illuminating cases in which the language of rights 
advanced radical social causes and showing how activists 
brought together the language of legal rights and demands for 
redistributive justice. Antiabortion history adds a valuable new 
chapter to this narrative. From the very beginning, lay actors 
and lawyers in the antiabortion movement relied heavily on 
rights rhetoric and calls for constitutional change. This 
emphasis on rights did not drown out radical voices or make 
invisible demands for social economic justice; far from it. 
Instead, rights language accommodated a wide variety of 
surprising claims. Those committed to a broader social safety 
net and a more robust protectionist state effectively used the 
language of rights to advance their cause, challenging existing 
social arrangements.256 Opponents of even the most 
mainstream aspects of the sexual revolution also relied on 
rights rhetoric to frame their beliefs and justify the social, 
cultural, and economic status quo.257 
Instead of finding themselves constrained by the language 
of constitutional rights, antiabortion activists contested the 
meaning of the right they championed. Distinguishing the 
effects of litigation and rights rhetoric adds weight to 
arguments that the language of rights can strengthen social 
movements. 
However, the history of antiabortion legalism cautions 
against generalizations about the perils of litigation or the 
 
approach on liberal welfare discourse has been to deemphasize, and even to 
discourage, redistributive rhetoric and goals in liberal discussions of the welfare 
system.”). 
 255. Roe itself has become a key example of the demobilizing effects of judicial 
victories on social movements. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Civil Rights Legislation 
in the 1990s: Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 766 (1991) 
(arguing that Roe “spur[red] opposition and demobilize[ed] potential adherents”); 
Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-constitutionalizing Abortion 
Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1409–13 (2009) (arguing that Roe legitimated existing 
patterns of intimate conduct and established a “profoundly inadequate social 
welfare net and hence the excessive economic burdens placed on poor women and 
men who decide to parent”). 
 256. Supra Part II develops this argument at greater length. 
 257. Supra Part II further analyzes this history.  
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virtues of rights talk. The appeal of litigation was only one of 
several factors pushing the antiabortion movement toward a 
focus on judicial activism. Political party realignment, the 
emergence of new social conservative groups, the financial 
struggles of the antiabortion movement, the rise of neoliberal 
politics, and the declining popularity of the welfare state all 
contributed to the transformation of antiabortion identity. The 
lessons offered by antiabortion history tell us only about the 
potential of litigation. A complex and ever-changing political 
landscape also often changes the course of contests over what a 
movement stands for. 
At the same time, litigation can push aside competing 
visions of a movement’s cause. The downsides of emphasizing 
litigation—path dependence and the loss of certain strategic 
alternatives—hamstrung the movement at a time when 
abortion opponents played down earlier arguments about 
constitutional rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Legal historians illuminate the complicated and ever-
evolving relationships between lawyers and the communities 
they represent. As the history of the antiabortion movement 
shows, court-centered strategies can also make a difference to 
internal struggles between lay activists. These struggles have 
high stakes, determining what a cause means and who is more 
likely to support it. By providing clear signals of progress, 
victories in court convince movement members of the value of 
certain strategies and the impracticality of others. However, 
tactical debates can intersect with larger questions of ideology, 
priorities, and identity. The indirect benefits guaranteed by 
litigation can change the course of the contests about what a 
movement represents. 
The story of antiabortion identity contests adds depth to 
debates about the value of litigation as a tool for social change. 
Historians, political scientists, and legal commentators have 
exposed the unanticipated costs of success in court. In addition 
to triggering a backlash, litigation victories can silence radical 
voices and demobilize activists convinced that the battle has 
been won. Legal mobilization scholars complicate this 
narrative, spotlighting the indirect benefits of either winning 
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or losing in court. 
At least for the antiabortion movement, these indirect 
benefits came with a complex set of costs. Winning in court 
vindicated the antiabortion cause, energized movement 
members, and illuminated a potential path forward. For 
activists desperate for signs of progress, the tactics used in 
court promised further advances, even in the context of 
lobbying, media interactions, or street protests. The more 
activists won in court, the more movement leaders invested in 
litigation, tailoring their larger lobbying and media strategy to 
maximize the chances that Roe would be overruled. Over time, 
in advancing court-centered strategies, movement members 
put more emphasis on the overreaching of the Roe Court, 
thereby framing their cause in a way that resonated with 
potential allies on the Right. Those activists whose view of the 
cause did not square with new, litigation-first tactics lost 
influence. Over time, the movement lost some of the flexibility 
that had helped it navigate the political landscape. 
The movement’s story also adds weight to scholarship, 
recognizing that rights rhetoric—by contrast to court-centered 
tactics—can empower both social-change agents and 
countermovement members. The right to life represented a 
blank canvas onto which activists projected dramatically 
different values. Far from deradicalizing movement demands, 
right-to-life rhetoric made room for claims involving 
socioeconomic rights, marital-status discrimination, and 
equality between the sexes. 
The effect of litigation on movement identity contests can 
be long-lasting, as the story of antiabortion battles shows. In 
the 1970s, a powerful group of abortion opponents demanded 
both broader access to birth control and an expansion of the 
welfare state. Today, activists holding similar views fight to 
find a place in antiabortion politics. The alliance between 
abortion opponents and the Republican Party has come to seem 
inevitable and unchanging. Litigation played a central role in 
bringing antiabortion politics to the present moment. As this 
story reminds us, victory in court not only helps to determine 
whether a social movement succeeds, but litigation also makes 
a difference as to what that movement means. 
 
